Showing posts with label growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label growth. Show all posts

Friday, 7 February 2014

Austerity Strikes Back

The tale of the hard-working North vs the lazy South has been cited again and again during the past couple of years, mostly from Northern politicians who saw the on-going crisis as an opportunity to promote their own agendas. At the core of this "argument" was the self-assuring conviction that "we do not need them (the South), they need us". Through an array of measures mostly aimed at austerity in order for state financials to regain their vigor, the North is surprised at the increasing debt-to-GDP ratio in the short-run and is accusing some of the South for not pushing through enough reforms.

As has been explained before, when GDP goes down, debt has to decrease by much more in order for the debt-to-GDP ratio to remain constant. Yet, this will obviously not be the case as the economy contracts much faster than the GDP can be reduced. In addition, when policies are based on austerity, results are usually much harsher for citizens than when they are not. Even though many have failed to see it at the time of implementation, austerity measures in the periphery also affect the North. The simple rationale behind this is that the North was (until now) basically exporting while the South was largely importing goods; the heavy reliance on each other was more than evident as in 2010, no country in the Eurozone had less than a 57% share of intra-EU exports.

Yet, many continued to think that a heavy reliance on exports was a sign of a "vibrant economy" which would lead to higher wages and higher domestic demand. The brief answer is a big fat no. You see, the issue here is that heavy reliance on exports means heavy reliance on the well-being of your neighbours; if your neighbours are poor it means that they buy much less from you than if they were rich. Simply put, reliance on exports means that if they go down, they take you down with them. 

The issue is not new. Some of us have already discussed this in detail, and warned that this situation cannot go on forever. We were (unfortunately for the citizens of the North which are not to blame for the mistakes of their governments) correct. The latest data show something quite startling: Retail trade in December 2013, the month which generally signals the peak in consumer spending, has decreased by 1.6%, compared to November.
In monthly terms, Portugal and Spain were the leaders in the drop, although this did not come as a surprise. The "surprise" is that Germany, Austria, Belgium and Finland have also seen a sharp drop in retail spending. What is even more astonishing is that on a year-to-year basis,  Germany, Belgium and Finland lead the race in the drop. As if this wasn't enough bad news, the bank de-leveraging procedure which has been going on in the periphery appears to have started in the North as well. Germany, Austria and France saw total bank loans to non-financial corporation reduced by 1%, 1.1% and 1.5% respectively, and even if this is not large compared to what happened in the periphery (and Slovenia with the extraordinary 23.8%) it is indicative of the worsening situation in the region.
As a result of de-leveraging and the decrease in spending, inflation in the Eurozone has dropped to 0.7% on an annual basis. Even though just 4 out of 28 countries experience deflation, the rest are barely above 1%; only Austria is close to the ECB mandate of 2%.

North's problem can be reduced to two simple words: no demand. You see, as others also note as well, while banks are not currently in a large need for de-leveraging and are more than willing to lend their excess funds, they cannot do it in their domestic markets as people, in contrast to what most monetary authorities would suggest, are not willing to borrow even at near-zero rates. Less borrowing means less spending, or in economic terms less demand. This results in deflation, which in its turn ends up being a self-perpetuating situation (unless this is stopped as Irving Fisher noted in 1933). As consumption comprises more than 2/3's of GDP, output falls when consumption is reduced.

The situation has begun evolving in Finland where output decreased by 1.1% in November 2013 compared to the previous year, with the same thing occurring in October 2013. The 0.4% contribution to GDP growth led by net exports in the country in 2012, is unlikely to be repeated until demand in the South picks up. With the main forces of the decrease in the 2013 GDP being domestic demand and inventories (both driven by consumption and demand) the path appears to be same as Germany where net exports are expected to take growth down with them in 2014. Even though the country's trade balance has also fallen in December, the effect of local demand, which fell by 1.6% has taken its toll in factory orders in the last month of 2013.

As the gains from trade are not translated into higher domestic demand (either by credit or directly), these have to be tunneled somewhere: housing prices in Germany have soared by at least 25% (in some cases more than 35%) since 2008. The Lehman story has taught us that housing bubbles are not a good thing; actually Deutsche should remember its experience better. With the rest of the Eurozone decreasing imports and domestic demand where does the North expect to ship that 20% of GDP in intra-Eurozone exports and how is it going to sustain the level of GDP currently obtained if domestic demand is also shrinking?

Friday, 10 January 2014

Hindering growth from within: Start-up costs

I'm sure you've all heard of it. It's been around the news for so long we do not even pay attention to it any more. It has become the favourite catchphrase of politicians and policymakers when they want to show they are sympathetic towards the perils of the populace. But it is often vague, it appears rather cold and insensitive and it lacks application. The word we are looking for here is growth.

It's all we've been hearing for the past couple of years. First came Ireland during the sub-prime lending crisis, then Greece, with each subsequent Prime Minister promising policies to rejuvenate growth, then Spain, then Italy, then Cyprus and even Germany. But most promises were nothing but thin air. The more we talk about growth, the more "emphasis" placed on the problem of youth unemployment, the more youngsters stayed out of the job market and the more GDP contracted. The latest (seasonally adjusted) data show that the trend is still on the rise:
Who's to blame for this? Some point at the ECB who has done very little  in order for the euro to survive (as they claim). I beg to differ. As already said the ECB's "whatever it takes" declaration was interpreted as a positive sign by the markets (although we usually forget this, markets are nothing but the collective wisdom of many humans). Then who might the reader ask? The EU? It's policies? No, not really. The simple answer is the Member-States themselves.

What follows is graph of the start-up costs per country, as obtained by the EU website, adjusted by the effective exchange rate. Note that the official EU "encourages" countries to allow for a set-up of under 3 days, at a cost of less than 100 euros. 
Of the 5 countries who required assistance or were in trouble during the crisis, Italy has the highest cost at €2046, followed by Greece at €1007, Portugal at €360, Cyprus at €265 and Spain at €120. Ireland is the only country which abides by the EU standards at €56. Things don't fare better when it comes to days of required to set-up a new business: 5 for Greece and Cyprus, 2-5 for Ireland, a surprising 1 for Portugal and Italy and a whooping 17.5 for Spain. Multiply the cost with the days required to set up a business and a rather different setting occurs:
While the multiplication may appear to be rather arbitrarily chosen (although the idea resembles the Misery Index) it shows the relative cost per country better than just the cost of setting up a business. For example, even though it just costs €120 to set up a business in Spain, the 17-day delay will mean that the cost rises; and note that the official amount of days is most likely the best case scenario where the application is perfectly completed with no mistakes at all, from either side. In this new setting, Greece dominates. It takes more than 1000 euros and 5 days  to set-up business there, in the best case scenario, at a total "cost" of €5036. Not that Northern countries would fare better: Germany would get 1445 in the above index, with Sweden at an even worse 2933. From what it appears, most Member-States need more than "encouragement" to do things like they should.

This unwillingness, nevertheless makes things tougher for their citizens. Think about it for second: what do start-ups have in abundance and what do they mostly lack? The answers are willingness and money respectively. Why should one bother with high costs and a mountain of bureaucratic obstacles (such as most periphery countries) and not set up a business elsewhere? That is why there has been a flight of the periphery's brightest to the North. As the Wall Street Journal notes, Ireland is ranked the most entrepreneurial country in the EU (the cost in the above index is a very low €196) followed by Sweden, the UK, Finland and Denmark. Not surprisingly, there were no periphery countries in the top 10 list. In fact, Europe actually lacks start-ups as The Verge points out. 

In order for unemployment to fall, we need new job openings. In order to get more job openings we need more investment. (Don't take my word that start-up costs hinder growth. Nobel laureate Christopher Pissarides and his colleagues showed evidence about this argument more than 10 years ago.) For investment we need two things: sufficient current demand or high potential demand and institutional support. Even if the periphery has the former it certainly lacks the latter. Why does this occur though? In a discussion with an MEP, she noted that there is a built-in resistance to changing these issues; perceived voter pressure is what holds them back. 

The magic word here is perceived. I doubt that any citizen would object to doing things faster than at the moment and I can really find no sane argument against that. If we all want more jobs and more investment in our countries then why should we object to this from within (and blame the EU about it) when we can do something to overcome these issues? It's rather odd to act like a victim when you are the culprit. So please, next time a politician speaks of growth and policies, just point the start-up costs and time needed to form a business.

P.S. There are more than one ways to build a better structure for start-up support. One of these ways has been online by fellow bloggers Horatiu Ferchiu, Alex Ghita and yours truly since 2012. Here are the links:

Friday, 3 January 2014

Spain's "Sucess"

Big news this week was that the ESM had successfully ended the support towards Spanish banks, a story which came in addition to the already positive outlook for the country. In the words of the Spanish Finance Minister "2014 will see the net creation of jobs, higher even than we predicted in September in the budget, and the jobless rate will fall". The ESM has also provided us with a list of the positive developments in Spain which made it possible for it to exit:
1. Bank restructuring is well underway.
2. Transfer of impaired assets to an asset management company (SAREB, i.e. a "bad bank") has been completed.
3. Steady reduction of Eurosystem funding.
4. Positive banking results in 2013.
5. Markets acknowledging Spain's progress.

While these are all good news, there are still many problems which have been kept hidden under the carpet. First of all, we 'll start with the infamous unemployment rate, currently at the staggering 26.7%, meaning that more than one out of 4 people in Spain is unemployed. Add to that an astonishing 56.1% of youth unemployment and you get a much better picture of how things are doing in the country. Oh, wait there's more: 7.1% of the labour force in the second quarter of 2013 was just working part-time, brining the percentage of the people working full time is just 66.2% of the population.
What does high unemployment indicate*? Since people tend to consume out of income, it means less consumption. The trend has been obvious in Spain over the past years:
With less consumption, firms will be facing more trouble than before, with the trend of new orders and firm bankruptcies continuing:
Don't let the decrease in Q3 bankruptcies fool you: remember that the Spanish economy is highly seasonal (as are most of the periphery countries, especially those with a large inflow of tourists) and as restructuring specialists commented "2013 is going to be the year with the most bankruptcy filings in Spain's history, without any doubt".

All of the above have important consequences to the health of the banking system: overall Bad Loan ratio climbed to 12.7% in September 2013 compared to 12.1% in August, while the severe deleveraging of the banks' balance sheets continues as we speak. The ESM focuses on the positives, yet the problem is that they use just Q2 data, which allows them to focus on what they like. For example, in Q2 industrial production rose by 0.8%, making some very happy. Yet, the Q3 data show that the increase was not permanent:
One cannot be certain of how Spain will fare in 2014, yet the popular opinion (and the one shared by yours truly) is that the coming year will be better than 2013. This has also been shared by the market: with the danger for a Spanish or an Italian default reduced, bond yields have decreased over time. Yet, whether the over-optimistic estimations of the Spanish Finance Minister will occur is something which is really doubtful. For significant growth, we need stabilization and Spain has unfortunately not yet stabilized.


The fact that the ESM stopped its backing of the Spanish economy is rather irrelevant to the stabilization of her economy: the credit provided was just the amount needed for her banks to continue functioning and nothing more. The Spanish authorities have agreed to exiting the ESM based on the fact that the worse is over. We agree on that; but it doesn't mean that the situation will get better. If anything, optimists would expect the situation to stabilize over 2014, with some quarter-to-quarter growth after the stabilization as the austerity-based new budget, with more cuts in spending and more wage-freezing for public servants. The country's increased exports make it more prone to external shocks and the payments for the debt assumed in order to revive the banks will drive policy for some years to come.

So, ESM, let's be realistic: Spain is anything but stable. Don't focus on just the positives and please give out up-to-date data. 2014 will be good for stabilizing the economy and some slight growth if the increased austerity does not cause more harm in the end. Everything else is just wishful thinking.

*Some argue that unemployment fell in December 2013. The problem is that the hires were highly seasonal and in addition, the Spanish labour force appears to be shrinking as Euronews reports. Thus, the good news are nothing but the absence of bad ones

Wednesday, 14 August 2013

We Can Have Growth But No Stability

One of the questions I have been asked lately was quite simple and yet it appeared rather hard to answer: "Why do we need growth every year? Why are economists so obsessed with growth and not with stabilizing output to approximately the same amount every year?" The question is usually asked by people who do not view capitalism as a good economic system but are too unwilling to make a change. As a former professor of mine once stated, the best thing in the world is to be a contrarian in a capitalist country; you get to keep both your money and your ideology.*

To be fair, economists do focus on growth. They do it because what they have studied has promoted them to think like that and they consider it so obvious that they waste no time in thinking on why it matters. In fact, we all somehow assume growth is good, we are just unsure why. The simple explanation is that growth is good since it creates more demand, more goods and most importantly more jobs and more money. This is a purely economical (and simplistic) explanation and one which will undoubtedly come under some criticism on the grounds of what people should really focus on or what they should do in their lives (which is really beyond the scope of this article). Still, as far as economics are concerned, growth is assumed to improve the well-being of every individual. 

Ideally, the best outcome of the combined action of policy and markets is full and stable employment. Yet, unless in the cases of war or re-building what the war has destroyed, we have never experienced full employment, and I doubt whether we could ever do that again (unless in wartime). The problem is that if we try to stabilize the system at a level far lower than full employment we would be having more unemployed than we could ideally have and this would create frictions in the markets. Stability would be meaningless if we have too much unemployment; simple logic states that we could do better by improving something. Nevertheless, even a stability scheme would not be sustainable even at full employment for the following reasons:

1. Changing population
Imagine that we have a country with a population of X million people of which Y are in the labour force (obviously Y<X). The unemployment rate is currently 0. During this time, aggregate demand is stable on average. Now imagine that the population rises every year. Unlike conventional economic models, real people do not start working as soon as they are born; they usually cannot do that until they reach a certain age. Thus, the family has to provide for their expenses, which means that although population has risen over time, aggregate demand is still the same as the family still gets the same income (inflation might cause income or demand to rise but this is not a real rise). Thus, assuming that the person will enter the labour force when he or she turns 18, as soon as that age is reached the person enters unemployment. The reason is practically simple: as long as you have stable demand you have no reason to increase your costs by hiring an extra person.

Now, let's assume that it's not just 1 person who enters unemployment each year but Z and they are in fact more than those who retire if we have a positive rate of population growth. Then, by the time firms realize that they have to employ more people to get more income, the number of unemployed increases. Given that such decisions about demand do not really come up so easily (and in addition, every other firm has to act the same way if they want to get back the amount they spend) and people are occasionally picky about what type of job they would like to do (the essence of search and matching theories) growth would be present and unemployment would fluctuate as population rises. 

2. The variable change in demand
In addition to the previous, demand is never stable even in case of full employment. As population changes, be it either growth or decrease, demand is altered every time. This is especially true of specific product demand. When demand is unstable, firms change output to fit it and thus both unemployment and total output fluctuates. Obviously, if the fluctuations are not large then there is no trouble in the system; unemployment may fluctuate but on average it will be stationary. Yet, if fluctuations are so large that the average cannot be maintained then we can forget about the system's stability.

Then question then becomes: why is demand so variable? Is it just because population changes or is there something else hidden behind it? The answer is both: increasing population leads to higher demand and falling population to less demand. Yet, as already stated, increasing population also comes with an increased unemployment rate until the new demand is settled in the economy. Although this may be considered as transitory unemployment, its duration cannot be specified. Decreasing population on the other hand presents the opposite: as demand is lessened, then firms have to scale down their production and thus unemployment is again increased. In both cases, it can be argued that the markets will work in such a way that unemployment rate will be stable in the long run; yet whether this really holds and how long is this long run is debatable.

3. Nature
Do you remember the last time someone predicted a flood? An earthquake? From what we know, nobody has, and it's quite doubtful if anyone will ever be able to do so. In fact, even if we were able to predict them, although human casualties would be minimal, material damages would still be large. We cannot move plants and other infrastructure as fast as we can mobilize people. Hurricane Katrina caused $81 billion of damages in 2005, with Hurricane Sandy causing an additional $68 billion in 2012. If we were in a system in which stability and predictability were the main characteristics then any deviation would wreck panic in the hearts of people. Which brings us to the most important of the factors:

4. Human Psychology
Recent experience indicates that people can either get excited too fast and too much about something (e.g. asset bubbles) or become afraid of something just as fast (market crashes). As the current system (or any system for that matter) functions with people acting within it, it is as stable as its constituent parts. Given that human behaviour ranges from one end of the spectrum to the other, how can we expect a system which is comprised of humans to be stable? More so, people, when acting in large groups fall victims of group psychology of either exuberance or hysteria much faster than when acting alone; in larger systems, the mood swings would be even greater, with larger consequences on them.

To illustrate this, think of person who is not really affected by austerity measures, or who is affected just a little bit. This person may believe that if his income is cut by 10% then he should cut his expenses by 15-20% so that he could save for a rainy day. Now imagine what happens in the economy when 10% of the population decides to do just that (for a tale on what happens this provides an example): demand falls, unemployment rises and a vicious cycle is initiated. This was one of the reasons austerity has not been successful; people fear about the future and tend to react strongly to an event.

Although some could argue that booms may increase demand by just as much crashes reduce it, the truth is that crashes do not really push it down that much. Although human beings are prone to large mood changes (just think of yourself: do you feel the same two days in a row? Doubt it. Most of the times we do not even feel the same in two consecutive hours) we are also prone to optimism and hope. It is against human nature to keep down and do nothing for a substantial period of time and that is how we got to develop from living in caves to exploring space. As Cullen Roche puts it, a measured optimist is the best world view.

Returning to the original question on growth and stability: we cannot stop growth and neither should we try to do so. It's what made us progress through the ages, what brought us the tools we are using now. Stability cannot occur in any economic system as long as it is run by people. Even in traditional economic modelling, population growth equals economic growth. If the system has what it takes to succeed then it will, no matter how many oppose it; if it does not the it will collapse sooner or later. Stability cannot be enforced on a system comprised by people exactly because people are unstable. While many economic models in the literature usually provide for a steady state in their analyses  they never take into account any shocks which could come from within the system, such as agent irrational behaviour or declining population.

The fact is, we need growth for stability as well as for incentives. If we are to grow with a stable rate of, say, 2% per year, then a shock which would contract GDP by 7-8% (note: this shock does not even count as a depression) would mean that we would face high unemployment and deteriorating social standards. Since we cannot eliminate the possibility of a large shock occurring all we can do to safeguard both ourselves and the economy from its impact is have as much growth as we possibly can, before and after the shock. The more growth we have before, the less destructive the shock will be and the less difficult it will be to overcome it and we focus on growth after its occurrence. We do not just aim for stability because stability provides no incentives to create, innovate and develop. For that, we need growth as we also want to be sure that when bad times come (and they will, for sure) we will be less affected by them.

To sum up, stability is something we cannot hope for in a human-based system, at least not in the way we commonly seek it. What we can do to make the most of it, is not criticize growth but try to stabilize that; this will act both as the prevalent force for development as well as a cushion for bad times.

*My personal view on the subject (in case anyone cared) is that although capitalism is the best system we have had until now (or better yet, the only one which survived) it still has plenty of room for improvement. We have gone a long way from the uncontrolled system in the early 1900's where the rich could practically manipulate everything they wanted. Nevertheless, the current system is far from perfect; we should aim for a better future by continuing to improve on our existing structure and not by demolishing it.

Thursday, 18 April 2013

Reinhart, Rogoff and Persistence on Austerity

Big news online yesterday were that researchers were finally able to replicate Reinhart and Rogoff''s (henceforth R&R) results on debt-to-GDP ratios and growth. As it appears, the authors did some serious mistakes including leaving several observations out of their sample (for no apparent reason) and some significant coding errors in Excel. Although many (including the authors) could argue that mistakes happen, it is not that often that these mistakes dictate fiscal policy in the world. The Guardian, for example, questions how many people have become unemployed due to this mistakes, while Azizonomics presents several occasions where such researches have been quoted by politicians, in defense of their actions.

The grander question would of course be why did politicians and economists place so much attention to one specific paper in the first place, especially when results were never so extreme. Let's us assume for a second that their results hold (presented below) and study them carefully.

Source: The Wall Street Journal
What notably hits most readers is that the average growth rate of real GDP when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90% becomes negative. What most did not consider was their methodology: R&R give equal weight to all countries after they had averaged their growth rates for any bracket. Thus, using this methodology means that real GDP growth has almost a 50-50 probability of being positive or negative. Then, this means that although there is no real GDP growth on average, it is very likely that we will have some nominal growth (which will in fact assist in repaying debt, if we are talking about the Eurozone).

Edward Hugh makes a another significant point: it all depends on the country and how developed it is. This would mean that it is easier for a developing country to allow her debt burden to increase, although it would be quite rough for a developed one (whether countries are allowed to print money or control monetary policy is of course another issue).

This prompted yours truly to make a little research of his own. In the following charts the reader may observe the average real GDP growth of a small sample of developed countries for 10-point debt-to-GDP brackets up to 200% based on annual observations (where brackets are absent no data were found in those-data range is dependent on the country).
United States
United Kingdom
Spain (quarterly data)
Italy
Germany
France
As not to bore the reader with too many charts, the following presents the average of the averages, based on the R&R methodology. 

The data indicate that not only does a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90% not decrease growth, but even as it increases over 100%, real GDP growth appears to persist, even on extreme levels. Although the dataset employed above uses data from 1949-2011, WWII could have something to do with the initial periods where debt was extremely high and growth persisted. Yet, this argument seizes to have any rational base for debt burdens of up to 120% (or higher depending on the country) or periods much later than WWII (as the specific case of Belgium and others indicates).

In addition, Arindrajit Dube argues that the above mentioned paper exhibits problems with causality. It not that debt causes growth, it is growth (or no growth to be fair) which causes the debt burden to increase (after a debt-to-GDP ratio of 30%). His "exercises" appear to be sound both economically as well as mathematically, yet although mathematics and statistics indicate a specific pattern, the truth is not so simple.

As with most things in life, it lies somewhere in between. In distinct cases (in which statistical aggregation is not helpful) both could be significant in predicting their future paths. In Dube's analysis, it appears that a decrease in the growth rate will cause an increase to the debt-to-GDP ratio. The question could be what caused this shock? If this is exogenous (e.g. a recession caused by bank failures) then Dube's analysis could be true. Yet, if a state wishes for some inane reason to increase its debt burden (say to increase social benefits for voters to like their government) it may have any effects on GDP depending on the way this is measured:

An increase in benefits has no direct impact on output as they do not constitute any part of it, yet it affects both consumption and investment. Thus, even as the debt burden will be increased, the growth rate of GDP will also be increased. Nevertheless, if a government insists on such policies, it may shift causality is on the side of R&R once more: debt can cause growth (or contraction). The mechanics behind this are simple. The government cannot sustain the increase in debt forever thus it will have to use some kind of consolidation for it to be sustainable, and through the mechanics better described here, it will negatively affect growth rates.

The simple conclusion is that people should be extremely cautious of non-replicated results. More importantly, when these results affect policy people should be even more cautious on how they use them, as they affect the lives of millions. As Richard Feynman, after having been led astray on the neutron-proton coupling constant by reports of "beta-decay experts" stated, "since then I never pay attention to anything by "experts". I calculate everything myself."

P.S. For those interested in the spreadsheets just send me an email

Sunday, 26 August 2012

Mario Monti and the Lost Generation

One piece of news which made a great impression on me was this: Italy's Secretary to the Prime Minister Antonio Catricalà has stated that youth under the age of 35 can start a business with only 1 euro as capital. I have said it before and I will say it again now: Mario Monti is amongst the best politicians (albeit an economist) who have ever set foot in the European stage. He cares about his country and is neither blinded by ideology nor afraid of any political consequences either at the national or the European level. He does what he knows best: revive the Italian economy.

It is the first sample of growth policies we have seen in the EU for months now. Announced measures for infrastructure in Italy are expected to reach 300 billion euros from now until 2020. Troubled areas in Rome, Naples and Florence are expected to receive an "upgrade" worth approximately 2.5 billion. 400 million are expected to be invested in internet technology to digitize the country's social services and boost buying and selling through the internet. For me what is most important is what I began with: every youth until the age of 35 may start a business with as little as 1 euro for capital.

It would be amazing if we could see such action from other member-nations of the EU. For the time being only Monti was able to show that he truly understands the situation and is willing to do something about it. What are we waiting for? For youths to start migrating from the EU to Australia like it is currently happening in Greece? (read this detailed article in the Guardian for more information). Should we stop and watch as people under 30 are constantly leaving their native nations for a "better" life elsewhere?

Mario Monti has spoken of a lost generation. What he meant were the myriads of young Italians fleeing the country in order to find employment elsewhere. Many leaders speak of the future, while they focus their policies to the over-50's population. The future cannot exist without the young. I remember Ernest Hemingway's story in the 1920's Paris: an old garage director told his young subordinate that he belonged to "une génération perdue". Hemingway wondered whether the youth who had seen the evils of war, were disciplined and polite could really be considered lost.

The same rationale holds today. Who is worse off might I ask: the person whose salary was reduced from 3000 to 2500 euros or the person who is desperately searching for a job and cannot find one? Yet with the notable exception of Italy, no nation (or politician for that matter) is doing anything about it.

Monday, 6 August 2012

Start-ups, Democracy and Growth

While the economic climate is deteriorating rapidly in South Europe what seems to raise our expectations about the future is the fact that in Spain, with unemployment reaching 25% and youth unemployment more than 50%, young people have began creating start-up businesses as a response to the economic crisis in the country. (for more information concerning start-ups in Spain read this).

Europe, especially in the South, does not have the same mentality or maybe not even the same resources when it comes to start-ups and establishing new businesses, as countries like the US or Israel do. The only nation in the EU that comes near this mentality is the technology-oriented Estonia which in 2005 it became the first country to offer Internet voting nationally in local elections. The feature itself is very impressive and something I would love to see in all countries. This will bring a new era in democracy, allowing citizens to have a direct opinion on many aspects of national affairs through courses of action like referendums. For those who love numbers 1.9% of the Estonians (approximately 9,300 people) voted online in 2005 whilst the percentage rose to an impressive 15.4% (150,800 persons) in the 2011 parliamentary elections.

Returning on the start-up discussion, with a simple visit to the EU grants website the reader may observe how many grants are targeted in  start-ups. Exactly none. Entrepreneurship is left to be promoted by individual countries and not at the EU level. Nevertheless, whilst in the UK (and to a much lesser degree in Germany), entrepreneurship attracts a rather significant amount of young talent, the South European mentality states that a job at a large corporation or in the government sector is a much more prestigious one. This is rooted in genes of all South European people, maybe a fact which derives from the instability in governments over the last century and has resulted in a need for a stable job, salary and life. (remember that Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece suffered through dictatorship regimes over the last century, with all of them experiencing terrorist attacks over time and Cyprus had been prone to rough civil disputes and a Turkish invasion in 1974). These experiences lead to a risk-averse society, with the specific mentality passing on to the next generations.

However, when talking to today's youth, this mentality seems to be changing. This might be the result of the economic catastrophe the aforementioned countries are facing, where the most stable of organizations of the past, the banking institutions, are proposing layoffs and shrinking of business activities to survive. It seems that the most prestigious employers have lost their reputations.

My hope for the future is that EU governments understand the importance of start-ups in the economy and provide financial assistance, in the form of subsidies or state-owned Venture Capital (VC) firms to aid individuals get the funding needed to start their business. This need only be done for a short period of time, since after the initial phase, more and more privately held VC firms and angel investors will emerge. The cost of funding a start-up is also very low as most of them require less than 100,000 euros to function. Given the amounts each country spends on foolish expenses each year sparing 10 million a year for start-up funding is infinitesimal. On the contrary, the outcome of such policies will be extremely beneficial as the now deteriorating economies will be able to bounce back, create thousands of jobs and restore confidence in the nation as a whole.

Tuesday, 31 July 2012

Interest Rates and Growth

In early July 2012, the ECB decided to cut the interest rate by 25 basis points (for those who are not familiar with the expression one basis point is 0.01%. So 25 basis points is essentially 0.25%. Don't ask me why the just cannot say 0.25% I have wondered about it many times before!). This was considered as an attempt to boost investment in the Eurozone, by making both lending and deposit banking rates fall. The following graphs represent the effect this policy had in Germany for deposits and loans with maturity up to 1 year (all the data for the following graphs were collected from the ECB website):
Deposit Rates

Lending Rates
As you may see deposit rates have been steadily falling over the last year, reaching a level below 0.5% in July. The lending rates had reached a top of 4% in late 2011 and have roughly stabilized at about 3.30-3.40% during the last months. Obviously the EU policy change had some effects in reducing the deposit rate whilst it had insignificant ones in the lending rate.

Now, compare this with the lending rates in Greece, Italy, Spain and Cyprus:
Cyprus
Greece

Italy

Spain
Notice anything different? Yes, indeed. For each one of these countries the interest rate has been higher than Germany's by about 1.2% in the case of Italy and an astonishing 4.1% in the case of Cyprus. Greece, with all the apparent problems in their economic system has a lending rate of approximately 7%! Although the EU policy of reducing interest rates from 1% to 0.75% has obviously had some effects in these countries. the fact is still that with lending rates this high there cannot be a significant increase in investment. Without an increase in investment the above countries cannot have the growth they need to raise from the depths of the banking and sovereign crisis they have entered about a year ago.

Rates this high did not even occur in 2008 in Germany where at its maximum, the rate was about 6%. While the common approach for central bankers and policymakers is to manipulate the interest rate when the circumstances require it, this is not always the optimal solution. In order for the banks to be able to lend, they themselves have to have an abundance of money and not worry whether they can achieve Core Tier 1 requirements which have increased in the midst of a banking crisis! (In the realm of bad decisions, this has to be one that deserves to be appointed king).

Thus, having no resources to lend, banking institutions in the South have to be extremely selective of whom they will lend. Having less than enough deposits, makes the deposit rates soar, making lending rates follow. More on deposit rates on the following article.

Thursday, 26 July 2012

Impressions from a Southern European Country

After watching that Cyprus has also applied for a bailout from the EFSF/ESM fund (following Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy) I decided to to watch a bit more carefully on how the situation will be handled this time. From what I can see in the news, the group of experts (or technocrats if you prefer) of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (the so-called troika) have reached the same conclusions as they had done before for the case of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy: Austerity Measures. Surprise, Surprise! As if any European citizen was expecting anything else.

News stories of what they intend to propose specify things like large cuts on government expenses, decreases in civil servant wages and benefits and increases in direct and indirect taxes. Although I am positive that the Cypriot state needs to perform some sort of rationalization over its expenses (the Southern European states have a much deserved reputation of not being very logical when it comes to government spending. An excellent example of such irrationalities is Greek government's allowance to the civil workers who arrived at work on time) this sort of thinking and acting will not ease the burden of a sovereign debt crisis. Judging however of the ease at which the troikans believe that austerity measures are a panacea I would propose that the next country that will need a bailout ship its accounting books to them and spare the EU some money on traveling!

As one may observe, austerity measures have not so far helped in easing the effects of the near-bankruptcy of Greece. In Spain, unemployment has reached 25% amongst the population and about one out of two youths under 25 is jobless. And yet, Mariano Rajoy's government announced huge cuts in the nation's budget which will only worsen the situation. Mario Monti's government of technocrats in Italy (in my opinion the best leader in the EU at the moment) has only taken 30bn euros worth of measures, and those in December 2011. In comparing the two states it would now seem that prospects seem slightly brighter for the Italians as per the spring 2012 European Commission forecasts. (for more details read the European Commission Economic Forecast. Be warned it is 190 pages long!)


As one may observe the Commission states that after 2012, a bright future awaits the Union.However I do not believe that such a comeback will be feasible so easily. In an already depressed economy the cost of slashing government spending is going to be more than the amount of money not spend.

As one may see from Google's public data Spain had negative growth only twice in the last 50 years while the more politically unstable Greece and Italy have had more ups and downs. On the other hand Cyprus's only year of negative growth since 1961 was 2009 (wouldn't it be nice if they could just keep it up? Damned bank exposure to Greece!). However, if you exclude the 1974 change in Greek authorities after the 1967 coup d'état, a year which was marked by a 6,44% Greece had not faced major economic downturns. The same holds for the Italians whose worst year was 1975 with a 2,09% drop.

According to the Debt-Deflation Theory of the Great Depression by Irving Fisher and the academics who have studied and written about it over the years (one of which in the Governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King) a large government sector has stabilizing consequences to an economy. In Hyman Minsky's Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (you can find it here) this idea is revisited and it is once again shown that a large government (up to a point obviously) is beneficial for the financial stability of a nation. (I am under the impression that the troika will not especially enjoy this paragraph) Thus the danger that may arise from an excess of austerity measures is to make the already fragile system more prone to future crises.

Following this ideas it is more essential to provide incentives for growth and then impose austerity measures. The logic behind the EFSF so far has been: we give you money if you promise to be frugal with them. Well gee EFSF thanks a lot! What would actually make sense would a be a policy of ''we give you money, spend them to boost the economy, and then impose some austerity measures". (If you are one of those who like to derive examples from economic history you may use the one of Theodore Roosevelt and the Great Depression) I once again state that I am not against the rationalization of government expenses. However, this should be done after the economy stabilizes and not before! If the economy does not grow how is the nation going to pay back it's lenders?

I guess that following the traditional German logic of keeping inflation low and finances tight at all costs led us to where we are now (a note on the solution of the Greek debt haircut on posts to come) and will keep us there until the Germans realize that the hyperinflation of the 1920's will not occur if the let the ECB act as regular central bank and print money. It would even make the value of the dollar fall which would help German exports! 

(Mrs Merkel please listen to reason! Most Europeans are bored of the same meetings with the same conclusions!)