Showing posts with label Eurozone. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eurozone. Show all posts

Saturday, 15 March 2014

Banks vs SME's: Who's the economy after all?

The title of Wikipedia's article on the crisis stars with a word which sums it it all up: Financial. What this means is that unlike others mishaps of the past, this time the trouble was mainly brought by financial institutions who could no longer survive. And since banks are not just like any other institution in the economy (in the sense that they provide the service of moving funds from one place to another, addition to lending) their importance was not big news to most (it was to some who believed that rescuing them was bad. Truth is, if Bernanke hadn't then we would be far worse than the 1930's).

In Europe, even though some of the troubles in the periphery are attributed to excess government spending, the truth is that the financial sector has also been a major cause of pain in at least half the economies in the EU (note that it has also been a problem in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, countries which do not often get the bad publicity of being in trouble). As in the US, governments in the EU rushed to save the banks, in most of the times with good reason. Yet, the emphasis on the banking sector has not stopped there; policymakers' preferences shifted to paying more attention on what the banks need instead of what is necessary for 99% of Europe's businesses: SMEs.

Unlike large businesses, who usually have ties with multiple banks, usually both domestic and abroad and have open lines of credit reaching hundreds of millions, SME's are faced with small business loans and very small credit balances. The increased capital requirements forced on banks and the now extremely picky procedure for securing a loan has brought many SME's to their knees. As the number of loans to the private sector is reduced, the SME owner finds himself without any sources of funding; while the data show that banks are doing better with regards to their loan portfolio, the market has in fact been suffocating.
The sad truth is that while we favour the survival of banks, we should remember that these institutions are mere intermediaries; it is true that the economy will freeze if banks collapse, but the same will occur if more and more SME's bankrupt day after day. Big businesses do not see their lines of credit diminished, but those who count the continuance of their day-to-day operations on checks who take days to clear, struggle with the reality of dying any time soon. Troubles are many, starting from the number of days required for a check to either be returned or cleared varies significantly among countries, (when it could essentially be done in less than a day in most), the increased fees required by banks to either send money abroad (even though SEPA is a major improvement) or to maintain certain accounts and finally the lack of any additional funding are major causes of headaches for people who do not have.

Since the emphasis is on the banks and not on the businesses, confidence that the economy will do better in the future is hard to build. How can the average Joe (and it is on his spending and his investment that we really count on) be convinced that things are doing better when he sees his company in the red, his friends and associates losing money and the business environment he lives in become harsher every day? We cannot de-emphasize the importance of banks but banks are nothing more than a small part of the economy; and since lending is limited (even in the best case scenario) we cannot be just focus on them and expect everything to go better.

I've said it before: we are at the ZLB so monetary policy is out of the question and our governments are constrained on spending making fiscal policy is not an option. All we are left with is confidence; yet, it cannot be raised if banks will not lend and make life miserable for millions across the continent. Yes, we need banks for the economy to move; but banks and the economy need businesses even more if we are ever going to see better days.

Friday, 7 February 2014

Austerity Strikes Back

The tale of the hard-working North vs the lazy South has been cited again and again during the past couple of years, mostly from Northern politicians who saw the on-going crisis as an opportunity to promote their own agendas. At the core of this "argument" was the self-assuring conviction that "we do not need them (the South), they need us". Through an array of measures mostly aimed at austerity in order for state financials to regain their vigor, the North is surprised at the increasing debt-to-GDP ratio in the short-run and is accusing some of the South for not pushing through enough reforms.

As has been explained before, when GDP goes down, debt has to decrease by much more in order for the debt-to-GDP ratio to remain constant. Yet, this will obviously not be the case as the economy contracts much faster than the GDP can be reduced. In addition, when policies are based on austerity, results are usually much harsher for citizens than when they are not. Even though many have failed to see it at the time of implementation, austerity measures in the periphery also affect the North. The simple rationale behind this is that the North was (until now) basically exporting while the South was largely importing goods; the heavy reliance on each other was more than evident as in 2010, no country in the Eurozone had less than a 57% share of intra-EU exports.

Yet, many continued to think that a heavy reliance on exports was a sign of a "vibrant economy" which would lead to higher wages and higher domestic demand. The brief answer is a big fat no. You see, the issue here is that heavy reliance on exports means heavy reliance on the well-being of your neighbours; if your neighbours are poor it means that they buy much less from you than if they were rich. Simply put, reliance on exports means that if they go down, they take you down with them. 

The issue is not new. Some of us have already discussed this in detail, and warned that this situation cannot go on forever. We were (unfortunately for the citizens of the North which are not to blame for the mistakes of their governments) correct. The latest data show something quite startling: Retail trade in December 2013, the month which generally signals the peak in consumer spending, has decreased by 1.6%, compared to November.
In monthly terms, Portugal and Spain were the leaders in the drop, although this did not come as a surprise. The "surprise" is that Germany, Austria, Belgium and Finland have also seen a sharp drop in retail spending. What is even more astonishing is that on a year-to-year basis,  Germany, Belgium and Finland lead the race in the drop. As if this wasn't enough bad news, the bank de-leveraging procedure which has been going on in the periphery appears to have started in the North as well. Germany, Austria and France saw total bank loans to non-financial corporation reduced by 1%, 1.1% and 1.5% respectively, and even if this is not large compared to what happened in the periphery (and Slovenia with the extraordinary 23.8%) it is indicative of the worsening situation in the region.
As a result of de-leveraging and the decrease in spending, inflation in the Eurozone has dropped to 0.7% on an annual basis. Even though just 4 out of 28 countries experience deflation, the rest are barely above 1%; only Austria is close to the ECB mandate of 2%.

North's problem can be reduced to two simple words: no demand. You see, as others also note as well, while banks are not currently in a large need for de-leveraging and are more than willing to lend their excess funds, they cannot do it in their domestic markets as people, in contrast to what most monetary authorities would suggest, are not willing to borrow even at near-zero rates. Less borrowing means less spending, or in economic terms less demand. This results in deflation, which in its turn ends up being a self-perpetuating situation (unless this is stopped as Irving Fisher noted in 1933). As consumption comprises more than 2/3's of GDP, output falls when consumption is reduced.

The situation has begun evolving in Finland where output decreased by 1.1% in November 2013 compared to the previous year, with the same thing occurring in October 2013. The 0.4% contribution to GDP growth led by net exports in the country in 2012, is unlikely to be repeated until demand in the South picks up. With the main forces of the decrease in the 2013 GDP being domestic demand and inventories (both driven by consumption and demand) the path appears to be same as Germany where net exports are expected to take growth down with them in 2014. Even though the country's trade balance has also fallen in December, the effect of local demand, which fell by 1.6% has taken its toll in factory orders in the last month of 2013.

As the gains from trade are not translated into higher domestic demand (either by credit or directly), these have to be tunneled somewhere: housing prices in Germany have soared by at least 25% (in some cases more than 35%) since 2008. The Lehman story has taught us that housing bubbles are not a good thing; actually Deutsche should remember its experience better. With the rest of the Eurozone decreasing imports and domestic demand where does the North expect to ship that 20% of GDP in intra-Eurozone exports and how is it going to sustain the level of GDP currently obtained if domestic demand is also shrinking?

Wednesday, 3 July 2013

Interest Rates on Sovereign Bonds: The Price of Debt

The aspect probably most sought after by the financial industry of both government and corporate bonds is yield. Yield indicates the yearly return a bond will give its owner based on the interest payments he will receive and the price the investor will acquire it for. Although at the time of issue a bond's yield equals its interest rate, the situation is soon altered as trading makes the two deviate. Yet, from the sovereign's point of view, the most important aspect of bond issuance should be the interest rate, for the simple reason that it reflects the price it has to pay for the credit received.

The rationale behind this idea is simple: when a nation has to pay more to get credit, its possibilities for growth are diminished as it is obliged to allocate more of the yearly budget to service existing debt, depriving resources from the economy both through decreased government spending as well as increased taxation or unnecessary money printing. In addition, funds employed to service the debt could have been used more effectively in promoting more growth, which in its turn would decrease the debt burden and the borrowing costs promoting a benevolent cycle. In the Eurozone, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that no nation has the liberty to use a sovereign currency, thus increased borrowing costs are a burden the taxpayer unavoidably has to assume.

On examining the current data on bond interest rates (one has to do some data mining to find what the average interest rate paid is) one of the most interesting aspects is that bond interest rates were increasing even before the crisis for some countries. The following is a graph of the interest rates on bonds of 9 Eurozone countries from 2001 to 2011 (data obtained from World Bank and Eurostat. Cyprus did not have any data at the World Bank database prior to 2007)


Not surprising, the lowest interest rate throughout the years has been the one of Germany, yet the Cyprus one is rather amazing. Historically, the island now notorious for setting a precedent on depositor bail-ins, had at a time been paying interest rates with a spread of approximately 7.5% from the German one. Yet, as it appears, the market caught up with what had been going on and in 2011 Italy, Ireland and Greece had taken her place as the leading interest payers in the region. Unfortunately, the World Bank database was not yet updated for 2012 data.

Nevertheless, although the numbers are not up-to-date, they indicate that the market has much predicting power, even in the case of sovereigns. Italy's interest rates have been on the rise since 2010 as have been Greece's and Portugal's although Italy has not yet requested any assistance, Portugal required assistance a year later and Greece did not file for help until mid-2010 and the aid received was for restructuring the debt. In addition, France has also seen interest rates rise in the last two years (2010-2011) as a result of increasing uncertainty about the state of her economy. One can safely assume that data for 2012 would indicate that interest rates in the troubled countries have further increased while in safer countries like Germany they have decreased.

This, is supposedly a problem the OMT should have addressed. When at the issuance of government bonds, the yield (which equals to the interest rate) in higher than a threshold (and importantly the country is still in the markets, i.e. not considered junk), the ECB has pledged to intervene and purchase the bonds itself. Yet, even at relatively lower interest rates than the threshold, a country's ability to service it's debt is severely affected if the interest due is high. For example, with debt at 108% of GDP in 2011, Portugal had to pay more than 5bn euros just for interest payments or approximately 10% of her revenues. The percentage for Greece was 17% of revenues while for Germany and France was just over 5%, making troubles for the Greeks even harder as they have to generate a large amount of money just to cover their interest expenses, without addressing any other problems.

Thus, if the problem of extracting large amounts of money from the population to cover increasing interest rates is not addressed, then recovery will almost certainly be delayed for even longer. As governments cannot print any new money, increased interest rates as a result of uncertainty and fear about the sovereigns' futures can only signify that more funds would be taken from the real economy and given to non-productive uses, creating a vicious cycle. This, will only add to the abundance of problems faced by the South while not promoting any solutions whatsoever.

Wednesday, 10 April 2013

The Economic Consequences of a CY-Exit

Ever since the latest Cyprus fiasco, many have been wondering whether a country exiting the Eurozone could be a possibility. The fact is that the Eurozone cannot evacuate a country as it will set a precedent (not that setting a precedent seems to bother them a lot, given that lately we have learned that every deposit over €100,000 is not safe). For the sake of argument we can assume that the Eurozone leaders can understand that if one country exits then it is only a matter of time before more leave; thus it is to their better interest to keep every country in the monetary union.

In addition to the assumption that leaders do understand the consequences of their actions, we will also assume that the exiting the Eurozone will allow the exiting country to remain in the EU which means that forcing it out will not forbade it from the common market (details on the subject will be discussed later).
To make things more specific, Cyprus will serve the cause of a case study. 

We know that Cyprus has an 87% debt-to-GDP ratio, a ratio slightly more than the EU average of 81%. As stated in a previous post, Cyprus currently has €9bn of her debt held by domestic creditors. Thus, even under the English law (which does not allow for any changes in the bond structure) if more than 75% of creditors are in agreement then the bond terms can by altered. One can only assume that the Cyprus Central Bank can excess some kind of pressure to the state creditors making them agree on longer duration and lower interest rates (from the creditors' point of view this would not be a bad deal; the alternative would be default and losing all the invested funds). Thus, if this can happen in Cyprus then it is not irrational to assume that it can happen in every other EU nation.

Re-structuring the domestic debt means less expense for the government for the next 10-20 years; the excess could be employed to boost the economy. Then, according to Alex Apostolides an additional €3.9bn would be remain (the rest was bank recapitalization needs which after the fall of Laiki bank are no longer needed), in addition to approximately €5-6bn of ELA money. Then the matter of which issue has more seniority arises. According to Megan Green:


Thus, in the case of an exit, ELA debt and any other European debt (such as Target2 balances) would be equal to every other issue. Then, if Cyprus (or any other country for that matter) chooses to partially default on debt repayments the ECB cannot do anything more than seize assets (which I doubt since it is not senior to any other debt and no actual assets are being on mortgage when a bond is issued-unlike bank loans). Under those terms the ECB would be forced to re-structure any loans it has made to Cyprus (again, the other alternative would be default).

Then we move to the trickier parts of the equation and first of all how will the new currency be introduced. An award-winning paper on Euro-exit states that at the time of the exit, the new currency and the euro should be at a 1-to-1 parity and that euros should be allowed for small transactions for a further 6 months. The first issue that has to be made clear here is that in the case of a euro exit, the new currency and the euro cannot co-exist for more than a week. Many have been arguing for parallel currencies yet, as history has shown and common economic sense dictates, this will cause much trouble.

The reason is simple: assume that on the first day the new currency will have a 1-to-1 parity with the euro. Nevertheless, the new currency will suffer a severe devaluation within the first hours (minutes?) of trading. Thus, if we assume a 40% devaluation as the most popular scenarios do, it would make 1 unit of the new currency equal to €0.60, which would mean that prices would have to be altered again as it would mean that now what cost €1 should cost 1.4 units of the new currency, just to make up for the exchange rate losses. Making matters even worse, the rate would not be at all stable during the transition period. 

A possible solution would be either to peg the new currency to the euro at 1-to-1 parity. However, this would never hold as the George Soros pointed out to the Bank of England in the 1990's. In addition, the willingness of Brussels to do that for a "traitor" is highly questionable. The only remaining alternative is a short transition period and capital controls through it. In order for the transition period to go without any severe effects on the economy (the two-week bank "holiday" is expected to cost approximately 2% to the country's GDP) it has to be fast and swift, with capital controls loosening significantly after it (unlike the very slow steps taken now). 

The only real problem faced by any nation who wishes to exit the Eurozone is inflation. The award-winning paper suggested that:

"The exiting country would immediately announce a regime of inflation targeting, adopt a set of tough fiscal rules, monitored by a body of independent experts, outlaw wage indexation, and announce the issue of inflation-linked government bonds.It also recommends that government should redenominate its debt in the new national currency and make clear its intention to renegotiate the terms of this debt."

The only trouble with the above is that inflation targeting does not assist in the short-run, where the economy will face harsh problems through increased energy prices. In addition, all of the proposed measures are more for the sake of credibility than actual good (in the short-run that is). Although inflation would be needed as a means to boost the economy, too much of it will prove to be disastrous, especially with regards to imports (it has been suggested that deposits will lose their value. This is not an issue per se for residents as everything will be evaluated in the new currency. This is only an issue with hyperinflation and increased import prices).

Economic theory (and practice) indicates that there are the following determinants of an exchange rate:
1. Domestic Money Supply/Inflation and Interest Rates
2. Import demand and Export Demand
3. Productivity (with respect to other countries)
4. Current Account balance and the Trade Balance
5. Domestic Reserves in Gold and other currencies

Another issue which cannot be measured is investor/speculator sentiment. For example, although the US has employed three rounds of monetary expansion (commonly known as QE) the euro continues to depreciate against the dollar because of the Eurozone uncertainty. We will return to that later.

The following data are before Cyprus's entry in the Eurozone (in 2008) and shall assist us in determining the needs of the country for a stable currency (click on the image for enlargement):
Source
The above graph indicates the exchange rate between USD and CYP (the reason for not choosing EUR/CYP is of less history and the fact that energy prices are quoted in dollars). The exchange band of the currencies fluctuated from a low of $1.44 per CYP (in late 2000, after Cyprus's stock market bubble crashed) and $2.5414 (in late 2007, perhaps due to the sub-prime lending crisis). In the meantime, Cyprus's other indicators were:

 

 In contrast to the views of many, it appears that from 2001 until 2007, when the CYP/USD rate was increased by 76%, money supply rose by 191% and foreign reserves by 112% (at their all time high). Inflation was rising during the period, with an approximate increase of 21.4% (or approximately 3% per year).
In addition, the current account was not doing any better either. The data show that as it reached its all-time low (by then) in 2001, the exchange rate did not resume its fall (it moved within the same band for about a year), and the year-end CYP/USD rate was actually increased. In addition, CYP continued its appreciation (reaching the all-time high) regardless of the fact that its current account reached new depths in 2007.
The Import/Export data do not show any significant difference over time either. Their average was pretty much zero until 2004, when the Trade Balance fell continuously until 2007. Yet, however, the CYP increased in value.
Oil prices are always important in an economy.Yet, although oil price rose from 1996 to late 2000 by 70% and the exchange rate fell to approximately $1.50, thus forcing the price of oil to rise more than 130%, real GDP rose by approximately 0.94% per quarter.

The last part of economic theory is interest rates: if interest rates are high, the investors/speculators will want to hold on to the currency; if they are low they do not wish to hold any of it. Yet, as interest rates are higher in a country, higher inflation appears and growth is supposed to be less than it could potentially be if the rates had been lower. 
Having an extremely high interest rate in 1999 did nothing to stop currency deterioration. As the reader may recall, the lowest point of the USD/CYP pair was in late 2000, just before the interest rate was lowered. As interest rates dropped to an average of 3.5% (which again is very high compared to other nations), the currency started appreciating.

In comparison, Cyprus today (as of 2012Q3) stands at:
- minus 990m on the current account (48% less than 2007 but 10% more than 2006 although the full year total will probably be less than 2006)
-341m of reserves (less than any period since 1995)
-101m of forex reserves (again an all-time low)
-563m in gold (an all-time high due to the increased price of gold)
-Deposit rates at about 3-3.5% for term deposits
-The least Balance of Trade (-1bn) it had over the past 8 years (since 2005)
-A slowing inflation (up just 1.2% in 2012 and expected to be near zero in 2013)

The only problems in Cyprus's position are foreign reserves and general reserves. The catch here is what Paul Krugman has been stating and many (including many Cypriots) ignore: 

-Income from tourism in 2012: €1.927bn or approximately 11% of GDP. (The income was actually higher in 2001 when the CYP was in place)

Such an influx of money (which will be even more if the depreciating currency brings more tourists than 2012) will increase the country's foreign reserves and help stabilize her currency. That is the reason why a euro exit should occur either before the summer season or just after it (if the island can survive until then that is). A devaluation of the new currency would in fact assist Cyprus to gain more tourists thus increasing that income.

The main cause of worry for the Cypriots should be oil prices. Yet, as the graphs have shown, rising oil prices is not the end of the world. Real estate, tourism and business services (which comprise approximately 60% of GDP) would be benefited from a devaluation of the currency, which means that more money would be pouring in Cyprus than before. This will again help stabilize the currency thus making prices less susceptible to oil shocks.

In addition, the other worry would be that of money supply. At its highest, M1 supply in Cyprus was approximately 36% of real GDP. Thus, according to data on 2012Q2, the amount of money supply would have to be roughly the same as it was in 2007 to compensate for that (i.e. €4.5bn). The amount of money used to recapitalize banks would not affect M1 as bank reserves are not included in its definition (nor are they included in the M2 definition). (This justification obviously assumes that money needed for recapitalization purposes will be treated as cash/reserves by the banks and not directly used for lending purposes).

A few paragraphs above, there was mention of investor/speculator sentiment. Imagine this: a country exits the Eurozone. Which that country is, does not really matter since once a country is out everybody else will start thinking about their own exit. Consequence: the euro depreciates. Sharply. With fears of a euro break-up, speculators will start shorting the currency driving its price down. Simultaneously, the CYP will itself depreciate, yet not such a fast pace as the euro, leaving it stronger than assumed. In addition, the USD will itself depreciate with regards to the CYP as the effects of the three rounds of QE will once again be visible. What economists seem to be forgetting in their analyses is that an exchange pair does not really count on just one currency but on both: if both deteriorate the same then the exchange rate is unaltered. 

Should the new CYP parity be 1-to-1 with the euro? Not in my opinion. The island would be better off in setting the parity a 0.5CYP to a euro to compensate for any potential currency depreciation. In addition, having the above-suggested parity would need less money supply to support it, making it both easier to create in shorter notice and simultaneously having the reverse effects of exchange rate overshooting in the short run (i.e. currency appreciation instead of depreciation).

Hugo Dixon presented the idea that Cyprus could lose competitiveness if the CYP depreciated because foreign labour will no longer be cheap. Yet, in a country with the largest increase in unemployment over the past year this will not be an issue. If cheap foreign labour force turned expensive it could easily be replaced with cheap domestic labour (unemployment is currently at 15% and rising). As for the current account having a deficit of 5% of GDP, the country never really had a strong current account balance (the least current account deficit was back in 1999 and it was approximately 4.95%).

What can be seen above is that if Cyprus wants to exit the Eurozone it is to its benefit. Although I would not strongly suggest that it does, the island has a very strong negotiating position now: it can request (or threaten) a euro-exit. Most commentators fail to see that if the country exits (or any country exits for that matter) consequences will be severe both for those who left as well as for those who are left behind. Cyprus has nothing to lose at the moment: she is facing at least a 15% decline in GDP in 2013 with no idea when growth will return. If she exits then a significant decline in GDP will also occur. The benefit though, is that it can control both its monetary as well as its fiscal policy which is much more than those which will be left in the Euro can brag about. 

If one country chooses to exit the Eurozone, either with the others' consent or without, the rest will have to live forever with the ghost of uncertainty lurking above them. Any austerity measures taken until now will appear to in vain. Which country will be the next? Will Italy, without a government and eager to relieve its citizens from the perils of austerity exit next? Will Greece? Or will mighty Germany decide to give up the throne of the Queen of Europe? Uncertainty will reign and the euro rate will collapse. Bond spreads will rise and the ECB will have to either use the OMT it has proudly presented in summer or watch it all fall like a tower of cards.

There is also another issue: whoever exits first, gains the most. Less depreciation, less uncertainty, less bond yields and more time to control its finances if (or until) someone else also leaves. As Megan Greece comments, in another example of a half-baked union "There is no mechanism through which Cyprus could be pushed out of the European Union in retaliation." In addition, there should be no country willing to kick another out of the EU just because they wish to exit the Eurozone since they can understand that their time may come soon enough. 

Thus, it can be safe to assume that Cyprus will not be etched out of the EU if it decides to return to the pound. The consequences of that are not as harsh as most people believe; yet they are not to be taken lightly. However, the island has more to lose if it remains in the Euro than if it exits in both the medium- as well as the long-run and it would be wise to use the exit scenario as a bargaining card.

Monday, 7 January 2013

Eurozone in Recession

It appears that what we had been thinking about has become a reality. In a recent article, Eurostat indicates that the Eurozone has retracted by 0.1%, while it rose by 0.1% in the EU27 in the 3rd quarter of 2012. Add this to the previously known -0.4% and -0.2% for the second quarter and we have our very first official recession for the Eurozone, meeting the formal definition of two consecutive quarters with negative GDP growth. 

What difference does it make one may ask? If one considers that GDP is a broad measure of the economy's well being, then it says a lot; notably that our economy is getting smaller and smaller with this having tremendous effects on unemployment, consumption, production and investment. As can be seen from the publication, investment has fallen by 0.7% meaning that the next quarter will be even harder if measures are not taken to ensure that investors regain their trust in the economy.

In the meantime, Spiegel has stated that Angela Merkel should tackle the problem of stabilizing Europe against the crisis in 2013. So far, the German government has done nothing to ensure that the crisis will soon be eliminated. All they have achieved until now, is a mountain of austerity measures which have destroyed the productive ability of most of the South's economies and proceeded in the alienation of Germany's views and tactics from the rest of Europe.

A rapid proponent of these views and tactics is the most important German economist (as a result of his position) is nowadays Jens Wiedmann, Bundesbank's President. In a recent interview, (which can be found here) he has stated that:
"The core of the crisis is located in the periphery countries: burgeoning household debt, excessive government debt and insufficient competitiveness, which creates doubts that those countries will be able to manage their debt burden on their own."
Not willing to come off very bad here Jens, but isn't the Greek haircut one of the major causes of the worsening of this situation? And let us remember who designed, proposed and voted for it: the Eurogroup. Let's also assume that every politician in the South was stupid enough to accept this without viewing the consequences it would have to their countries. How about the Bundesbank or the ECB? Out of the thousands of economists employed there not even a voice of disagreement on the had been heard. And now, competitiveness, household and government debt are being blamed. 
Hamburg Bundesbank. Source: Wikimedia Commons. Author: Andreas Praefcke
I would not argue against the South having these problems. Yet the transition between over-spending and spending would have been easier than the transition between over-spending and no-spending! The point is we did not need such a great recession in the first place. The transition could have been much smoother had the ECB and the Eurogroup taken better measures to tackle the situation. Let us not forget however that the crisis is, first of all a crisis in institutions either in business and finance or in politics.

Nobody can remember all announcements by either the ECB nor the Bundesbank but if my memory serves me right neither of the aforementioned institutions had said anything about competitiveness or household and government debt in the periphery. If they had not known then why are they blaming Member-nations now or if they had known why didn't they warn us about this? It appears that the Bundesbank is merely trying to save its reputation and justify its actions and stance on the whole subject by assigning the blame to someone else.

Friday, 21 December 2012

Downgrades and Indecisiveness

My warning yesterday was that the Cyprus memorandum would not be sustainable; this morning the Standard&Poor's rating agency rushed to agree with me. In their report, they state that the two-notch downgrade to CCC+ is because of  a considerable and rising risk that the country, may default. Heavily exposed banks (with the banking system assets around €95 billion), an optimistic forecast of a 3.5% contraction in GDP and EU indecisiveness with the agency calling it "hesitant attitude of Cyprus' Eurozone partners toward sharing the cost of a severe banking crisis" are what the S&P see as causing the most trouble.
S&P headquarters in Manhattan, New York.
Source: Wikimedia Commons Author: Beyond My Ken
Well, this isn't something new: the EU leaders speak of more union and yet fail to keep up with what they suggest. The EFSF/ESM funds have been created exactly because sovereign governments should not be liable to rescue banks unassisted; official EU assistance should be made available in order for the underlying country not to assume large debt burdens. Yet, the funds have not yet supported neither Greece nor Cyprus and thus far I am not quite sure about what they plan to do with Spain.

Spiegel states that the IMF officials have demanded a debt haircut before anything is signed. Unfortunately, these people appear to be as stubborn and unwilling to change their minds as the EU colleagues. It would appear that narrow-mindedness is in the job description.
Question 1: Who owns the majority of the Cyprus sovereign debt?
Answer: EU banks, notably Greek and Cypriot banking institutions
Question 2: Who is going to be in trouble when a debt haircut occurs?
Answer: The Cypriot and Greek banks who are already in life support.

The point of the above two questions is that if a haircut occurs, then the IMF and the EU will need even more money to support the system. What has happened to Greece will be repeated in Cyprus as well. Two or more years of a huge recession, which will destroy the economy's production capability, throw consumption down the drain and minimize investment. Austerity measures will lead to more austerity measures and the result will be like a vicious cycle.

The EU officials fear that a haircut will undermine investor trust in the Eurozone. You think? Undermine is putting it softly. What do you believe a major investor will think when every time a country faces trouble the EU forces it to cut down its debt? Obviously there are safer markets and better returns to put his money in. Now my question becomes: what do you think will be easier than the EU supporting the Cypriot or any other country's banks directly, just like it announced it would do? Incredibility once again. And then politicians wonder why markets do not trust them. Even if direct support from the EFSF/ESM funds cannot happen (if this holds then just shut them down why keep them?) then why not lend the country with an interest rate of 1% or lower, or even cancel interest payments for the first two years? Either of these should work and this was what they should have done with Greece.

In a short note, moving to a different country, Italy's Prime Minister Mario Monti is expected to resign tomorrow and new elections are to be held. God only knows if things will ever get better in the country as one of the most popular candidate appears to be former PM Silvio Berlusconi. If any of the readers has ever watched Frank Capra's "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington" then you will certainly see the similarities. Old, rich guy tries to gain more power for himself by manipulating the media channels he owns. In the movie, however, we were pleased to see a happy ending; now it is time for the Italians to choose their own.

Thursday, 29 November 2012

Questions on the Crisis

Source: council-tvnewsroom.eu
After observing the outcome of the latest Eurogroup meeting (you may find a commentary on that here and here) and thinking about what led us to where we got not, there are still parts which do not make sense. Things that could have easily been avoided and yet nothing was done to safeguard growth and stability in the EU. The 2 major questions which spring to mind when considering past and present decisions are:

1. Why did European Finance Ministers agree for a nominal haircut of 53.5% on Greek bonds held by private investors?

We can all understand that the European leaders all wanted to find a fast solution for the enormous amount of Greek debt. That time was of the essence and a clear plan was in need. Nevertheless, the fact that Finance Ministers in Cyprus, Spain and other nations who had large exposures to Greek debt failed to oppose such a plan still amazes me. What happened? They did not know what the consequences would be? If most newspapers around Europe knew how much government debt each bank had they how could they have not known? The mathematics of calculating the results are more than straightforward: a 9-year-old could have done them without the use of a calculator. Even if we do accept that the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble pushed for the deal to go through, given that German banks were large enough to take their losses without causing any problems to the economy, and even if he had support from other Ministers, why did the Southern Ministers not oppose or veto his proposal? There are only 2 rational explanations for this: either Finance Ministers are incompetent and did not think of what the effects would have been, or that they are parts of dark plan to bring the EU to an end. Given that they are now trying to solve the problems they themselves have created we can easily assume that the latter does not hold. So that leaves us with option 1...

2. If the IMF and the EU both know that growth is more important than austerity when trying to cope with a large debt burden, why are they imposing harsh austerity measures on any country who asks for a bail-out?

To quote IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard's Ten Commandments for Fiscal Adjustment in Advanced Economies article, "a one percentage point increase in potential growth—assuming a tax ratio of 40 percent—lowers the debt ratio by 10 percentage points within 5 years and by 30 percentage points within 10 years, if the resulting higher revenues are saved." We can easily assume that if the Chief Economist knows and writes about such an issue, then everybody in the IMF should know this as a fact too. If this is true, and by the way if one studies the aforementioned article more arguments against extreme austerity can be found, then why is the IMF so bent on imposing so harsh measures? Nobody can agree more than me that reforms are needed in all EU-periphery countries; even if they are harsh and difficult to be implemented. Yet, a reform is a much different thing than just slashing pensions and wages. I can understand abolishing most (if not all) of allowances paid by the state to civil servants. I can even understand a reduction in social allowances like unemployment benefits and support allowances due to the fact that state expenses have to be reduced. Yet I cannot see any possible rationale for slashing wages and pensions by large amounts, especially during a crisis period where the state is supposed to help boost consumption and not further reduce it. What makes things even worse is that even though the "Greek experiment" yielded terrible results over the 1.5 years that the Troika has been involved in it, they are pushing the same "reforms" in Cyprus. If Spain and Italy follow, then France and Germany will be next in line, until they finally decide to do as they preach.

The above have been puzzling me for some time now. If any one can assist me in understanding the rationale behind these decisions please do. I, and the rest of Europe will be forever grateful.

Saturday, 3 November 2012

Unemployment Update in the EU

Source: Eurostat
Well, the figures give more or less the same story as last month. Unemployment is roughly the same in the EA17 or the EU27 (up just 0.1% in the EA17), Greece and Spain are champions both in youth as well as in overall unemployment, Italy, Ireland and Cyprus saw their unemployment rate rise while Austria's, Netherlands's, Luxemburg's and Germany's remained the countries with the lowest figures.

What I am eagerly waiting for some time now, is for the Eurostat announcement that EU27 and EA17 GDP has contracted over the last quarter thus officially throwing the Union into recession. I am not doing this out of hate towards the Union; just because I hope that this will be a wake-up call for politicians and policymakers all through Europe that what they have been doing up to now is erroneous. What the reader may ask is whether they have the common sense to admit their mistakes, which unfortunately I cannot answer now. Time will show and hopefully after that time we will still be part of a Union. Better late than never.

Change can only come from within as Protesilaos states in his latest article. Here's the part that I liked the most:
"The troika's "expertise", or in general the technocratic, "objective" knowledge of the various bureaucrats that make crucial decisions on the citizens' behalf (e.g. the preposterous proposal to have a Commissioner veto national budgets), is in effect nothing more than the facade which conceals an apocryphal desire or rather a specific strategy for the redesign of the Euro area along the lines of a corporatist-neoliberal economic system that will realize economies of scale for a selective corporate elite at the expense of suppressing the standard of living of most people across Europe; while also rendering any spontaneous entrepreneurial initiative practically unprofitable or near-impossible due to the complexity of legislation and entry criteria, which always operate as means of insulating big business from the powerful forces of real competition (neoliberalism should never be confused with genuine free markets)" 

I do not know whether there is a plan or strategy behind Troika's decisions. Nevertheless, it seems that the measures they are proposing are damaging the middle and lower class and leave the upper class unaffected. This basically means that people pay for the faults of their governments and/or banks without the latter assuming anything of the blame. Now I do not know how do you call such a regime but exploitism sounds like a good name.

Monday, 22 October 2012

The Agreement to Do Nothing

All media sources were buzzing on Friday that "a historical agreement" between the EU27 had been achieved, that " Merkel and Hollande both had to compromise" and most importantly that "an agreement for bank supervision by the ECB has been reached". Well, I guess that's one part of the truth.
Francois Hollande and Angela Merkel. Source: Wikimedia Commons

In brief, what they have agreed is that the EU should have one authority supervising all the banks in the EA17 (all the nations which are using the euro as their currency), notably the European Central Bank, and that the start date of this should be the the 1st of January, 2014, instead of January 2013 as had been proposed by many EA nations. The issue for moving the date was that supposedly they would not have been able to have the legal framework of the regulatory authority ready until January 2013.

To be honest, I do not believe that. Regulatory frameworks can be completed in weeks if the need arises so what is the real cause behind all this? I guess it would have to be the fact that many nations both in the EU as well as in the EA have not yet accepted that they are part of one big family. The other reason would be that with Spain and Cyprus opting for bail-outs (the former is expected to do so in a few weeks and the latter is about to achieve an agreement with Troika in the course of this week), such a regulatory framework would mean that banks and not nations, would be accepting the financial assistance. This would make the nations less liable to reforms and austerity measures (although the deal is that in order for their banks to receive funding the countries themselves have to push through measures and reforms) which is not something austerity-bound Angela Merkel would enjoy. Thus, we are now witnessing the effect of a nation trying to rule the EU, with everyone else doing nothing about it.

In addition to Merkel's resistance on common bank supervisory system, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and his Czech counterpart Petr Necas were also against "moving too quickly". Both the aforementioned nations are not part of the Eurozone for the time being. The big question here is why do nations outside the EA17 have an opinion and may block decisions that will affect only those within the EA17? Their answer usually is that they might have banks which are operating in the Eurozone so the decision is affecting them as well.

This is the same line of reasoning which would essentially mean that if these nations have the right to block legislation wherever their banks operate. I would like see them try to pull something of this kind off in the US, or Russia! Well I assume it wouldn't work. Germany on the other hand is trying to promote a solution of regulating just the largest of the banks. Yet, as usual, half-solutions are never the answer. Either the EU should go through with it all the way, or not at all. All other options are going to be a waste of money and people.

P.S. "Those who speak most passionately about political union are often the ones who hesitate the most when it comes to making pressing decisions,"said Francois Hollande. And he is probably right.

Tuesday, 28 August 2012

5 Causes of Financial Instability in Europe

As the EU crisis continues to unfold, many academics, investors as well as everyday people have lost their faith in the Union. They view more weaknesses than strengths in the Eurozone structure, and are under the idea that these weaknesses will lead the Union to its doom. On the other hand, there are those who have the firm belief that the EU will make it through, even if it takes some troubled years, and will emerge stronger and more unified from the crisis. 

Both groups are correct up to a point: Although the destruction of the EU does not seem eminent, there are some important issues which undermine the well-being of the Union. The most important of them are:

(i) A non EU-wide bank regulating authority. Currently, the EU member-nations have the sole responsibility to regulate, supervise and recapitalize their banks. A separate authority should be created in order to monitor banks and have the sole responsibility for their  recapitalization. This authority will comprise of officials from all EU member-states. Thus, if a bank recapitalization is needed the host country will not have to directly move to guarantee it as the authority will be responsible for it. In this way, the countries do not have to use their tax-payers money in order to bail-out the institutions.

(ii) Excessive public spending by EU governments (especially in the South). Unfortunately, people in the South knew that their governments were overspending years before this crisis occurred. Not to be fooled though, Northern nations were overspending as well (e.g. Germany, Austria and many others). However, everyone kept silent about this as no trouble had yet happened. The Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the Sixpack and the Euro Plus Pack which followed, are great ideas, nevertheless with little implementation. The reason is simple: what will stop a nation from having a large deficit if it needs to? Nothing at all. While the Packs and Pacts are full of proposals and ideas there are no "punishments" for those who wish to deviate from them. What happened when Germany had public debt of more than 70% of GDP for three consecutive years? Nothing. What will they do after the crisis ends? Return to the Packs and Pacts and after 3-4 years when all is forgotten governments will once again start spending more. The issue is not for the small nations. If Cyprus, Greece or even Italy are sanctioned by the EU they will most probably do as they are told. Will Germany do the same? I highly doubt it. 

(iii) Lack of ECB independence and discretion. As of the current regulatory framework, the ECB cannot act on its own will as it has to have Member-States' permission.  This makes the procedure of aiding an ailing nation or banking institution much slower and bureaucratic. Under the current scheme the role of the ECB is not the one of real Central Bank, like its counterpart in the US. If the ECB is not allowed to function autonomously then there is almost no need for its existence. The need for a better Union is tied together with a need for an autonomous bank which is allowed to act at its own discretion.

(iv) Non-integration of institutions, in favor of common policies. Most of the institutions in the EU have restricted powers and this does not allow for much to be done. Also, under the current structure, the only authority "paid to think European" is the European Commission. Thus, the need for more institutions which are EU-orientated in their policies arises. Aside of this, the aspect of granting more powers to the EU institutions is an issue which has to be settled. If the institutions are allowed to function as they should then more political union would occur in the region, thus making it easier for the monetary union to survive.

(v) Member-States leaders who believe the EU is their protectorate and have the notion that in order for anything to be done they have to grant their permission (Wonder who this makes me think about Angela....)

Thursday, 23 August 2012

Investor Pessimism

Lately, I have been reading a lot about investors, banks and nations preparing for the worst case scenario. It seems that the definition for "worst case scenario" differs from time to time: a Greek exit, a Euro collapse, a banking collapse, a Eurozone collapse and so on. Obviously one has to prepare for such events. What I always thought to be weird is that people always prepare for "worst case scenarios" only after recessions or severe economic blows occur. One should never be worried by pessimism or optimism in the markets. Although they may last long in many cases, they are always alternating. They are both outcomes of human nature, a sort of behaviour that was the same throughout the years.

All of the great investors throughout history understood this. People are always prone to good or bad feelings. A bear market (e.g. a falling index in the stock exchange) occurs when people feel overly pessimistic about the present and the future and a bull market (the exact opposite, a rising index) occurs when people feel overly optimistic about it.

A great example of this is the banking situation nowadays. Banking institutions after expanding rapidly in the last decade (overly optimistic) are now contracting their business operations to operating only at the local level (overly pessimistic). Cross-border lending is steadily declining in the EU reaching 2007 levels in last June. Otmar Issing, a former ECB chief economist states: "Over the long term, the monetary union can't be maintained without private investors,because it would only be artificially kept alive." While this is true and many feel that getting rid of their assets in euros and buying gold or real estate is a great idea, others have gone even further by removing themselves from the monetary zone. 

Many investors are even betting against the euro surviving. John Paulson, who made billions shorting (i.e. selling something now - e.g. a stock or a currency - in hope of buying it later at a lower price and thus profiting with the difference) during the sub-prime lending crisis in the US and the now retired George Soros stated that they are betting against the common currency. 

As for me, I wouldn't worry about bank contraction. Both economies and firms contract and expand as they react to the general feelings of threat or hope for the future. A crisis is a good opportunity for people, firms, economies and states to learn from their mistakes. What I hope is that politicians and policymakers will realize the need for action. Even late action is better than no action, however too late would mean the end of the euro as many investors prophesied.

Wednesday, 22 August 2012

Undelivered Promises

The Cypriot government has announced that its fiscal deficit has reached 3% for the first 6 months of 2012. Not long ago, they were stating that the deficit would be 3.5% for the fiscal year of 2012. Now, I am no expert in numbers but anyone in their right mind would understand that having a mere 0.5% rise in deficit over the next 6 months is a Midsummer night's dream (Unless of course very drastic measures are taken, a far-fetched scenario however). The Cypriot government has moved along the same lines as the ECB. It usually states "we will not have a deficit of more than 3.5%" or "austerity measures will be taken", however, nothing of the like ever takes place. The credibility of the government is long lost in international markets and regaining it would be hard (if not impossible).

Credibility issues have been a problem in the Eurozone ever since the sovereign debt crisis has emerged. You may remember Draghi's statements of doing what it takes. Of the crisis-ridden economies only Mario Monti has held to his credibility, and to my surprise the Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras is trying to regain it for his nation. Who would expect a Greek to deliver what he had promised? Certainly not the Germans, and certainly not most Europeans. In an interview in Bild (found here in English), Samaras states that what they are asking is for more time not more money. In his words: "Let me be very explicit: we demand no additional money. We stand by our commitments and by fulfilling all our requirements. All we want is a bit of 'air to breathe' to get the economy running and to increase state income. More time does not automatically mean more money."

What Antonis is asking is what I have proposed here, here and here. Specifically that he is given a larger time-frame to push through the additional reforms. I was stating yesterday that if the crisis ends now, Greece will be the only country in the South to benefit from it. To back me up on that, Samaras stated: "We will soon have a smaller, healthier and significantly more efficient public service.We are making progress, we are reducing the overall number of public servants and I have decided to hire only one person for every 10 retired civil servants."

Large public sectors and low productivity have always been an issue in the South. I can confirm that as well, based on personal experience. What now seems to change is mentality and the political will to promote reforms. I honestly hope that this is not just an outcome of EU pressure on the country. It would be too bad if it was. The Greeks now have a genuine opportunity to live in a better country. It would be a shame to blow it like they did in the past. Credibility... It haunts people and nations for so long...

Monday, 20 August 2012

On Yanis Varoufakis's Modest Proposal

Yesterday, Yanis has posted a new article which contains some new Q&A over his modest proposal. Although he provides some clarifications he does not specify others. I still have three questions unanswered:

1. Why should the ECB issue Eurobonds and not move in directly to help a nation? A constraint Yanis uses it in his Modest Proposal pdf is: "The ECB will not be allowed to monetise sovereigns directly (i.e. no ECB guarantees of debt issues by member-states, no ECB purchases of government bonds in the primary market, no ECB leveraging of the EFSF-ESM in order to buy sovereign debt either from the primary or the secondary markets)". Nevertheless, the problem is exactly this. The ECB does not need to issue Eurobonds in order to aid ailing countries. This could happen simply, and more efficiently, by directly purchasing government bonds or guaranteeing them. Of course, this would be a difficult policy needing the unity of all the political leaders of the EU, however, it is the best solution for ending the current crisis. It is what should have been done in the first place (read An Alternative to the Greek Bailout for more) without resorting to the Greek haircut "solution".

The solution Yanis is proposing would mean that the ECB will basically act as an intermediary between investors and nations. The ECB would issue the bond, guarantee it and at its maturity the nation would (for Yanis's example) repay 2/3 of the debt while the ECB would repay the rest. What happens if the nation defaults one may ask. Yanis's solution is: 
"To safeguard the credibility of this conversion, and to provide a backstop (for the ECB-bonds) that requires no ECB monetisation,
(i) member-states agree to afford their ECB debit accounts super-seniority
status, and
(ii) the ECB’s conversion servicing loan mechanism is insured by the EFSF/ESM. E.g. if a member-state goes into a disorderly default before an ECB-bond issued on its behalf matures, that ECB-bond payment is covered by insurance purchased or provided by the EFSF/ESM."

Even if a nation agrees that this kind of debt would have super-seniority (i.e. it has to be repaid before anything else is repaid) it would not mean anything if the nation is nearing default. Seniority of debt only has meaning when there are enough money to repay the debt. If the nation cannot repay a single cent what difference (other than psychological for the debtors at the time of issuing) does having super-seniority make? Practically none! 

Then comes condition (ii): If the nation defaults then the EFSF/ESM covers the debt. If a nation reaches default then nothing differs from the current situation. The EFSF has to cover the nation's part, meaning that the EU is basically repaying for money used by the nation, which would make the nation accountable to them, which leads to the same result as if the ECB would directly move to guarantee or purchase the nation's bonds.

Besides, this scheme does not promote the Central Bank's independence and power. One of the main issues of the crisis is that the ECB cannot act as a real Central Bank. If it was allowed to function like that then TARP-like interventions would have taken place by now (at least I hope they would). Which means that this plan provides a non-stabilizing and non-permanent solution, which does not promote the ECB's power, independence and it's ability to act on its own discretion.

2. Question number two concerning the feasibility of Yanis's point 3 (the EIB expanding its projects in order to boost investment) is articulated in this article and is summarized as:
(i) If the EIB has lucrative projects in its arsenal, as Yanis states, then I would assume that the projects are spread all over the EU and not just focused in the South. Thus, it would mean that investment would not be focused in the EU-periphery.
(ii) If the EIB is forced to fund mostly projects in the South wouldn't that be unfair to the other countries in the EU and wouldn't that lead to investing in less and less profitable projects? (A suitable example for this would be a university forced to accept 10% of all applicants from nation A - let's say that this would amount to 50% of its student population - and the rest from other countries. If the university is forced to accept 20 or 30% of the applicants in nation A then more bad students would attend that university than before)

Most importantly:
3. None of these points have anything to do with the fact that the Periphery faces low productivity, is in the midst of the burst of a property bubble and what economists call "bad institutions" (i.e. bureaucracy, ineffectiveness, corruption, etc) nor do they have any way of altering the situation. (for more details read Do We Need a Crisis?)

Friday, 17 August 2012

The Effects of a Euro Collapse

Some believe that the destruction of the Eurozone, and as a consequence the collapse of the common currency, is eminent. Many actually look at this favorably as they believe that such a result would be beneficial to the world. I have read articles stating "why doesn't the Euro collapse to get over with this situation? We will deal with the consequences and then be better off". The problem is no one seems to understand what these consequences are. 

The following is an excerpt from a Financial Times article in 2011 (article can be found here):
"A euro area breakup, even a partial one involving the exit of one or more fiscally and competitively weak countries, would be chaotic. A full or comprehensive break-up, with the euro area splintering into a Greater Deutschmark zone and about 10 national currencies would create pandemonium. It would not be a planned, orderly, gradual unwinding of existing political, economic and legal commitments. Exit, partial or full, would likely be precipitated by disorderly sovereign defaults in the fiscally and competitively weak member states, whose currencies would weaken dramatically and whose banks would fail. If Spain and Italy were to exit, there would be a collapse of systemically important financial institutions throughout the European Union and North America and years of global depression."
Does this sound bad enough? The article states that a Greek exit could be manageable. It could be, only if the ECB decides to bail-out the EU countries which would be affected by that exit (That would be hmm... almost every country in the EU, even Germany). If the ECB decides that it would help the countries which would face disaster after a Grexit then why not help Greece directly and avoid such an outcome? The outcome of an Italian exit would be even worse given that it is the 8th largest economy in the world. You may only imagine what would happen if Germany were to exit.

The aftermath of an exit would occur not only to the Union but to the exiting country as well. For example, a Greek exit would mean that prices and wages in the country would fall rapidly, gaining a short-run competitive advantage which would be lost after inflationary powers settle on the country. As a result, the country would be poor, uncompetitive and with the additional disadvantage that no one would dare lend it because it that had just exited the EU. If Germany exits then the new German currency would suffer such an up-rise which would make all German products uncompetitive, leading the now booming German exports to a downward spiral.
In another article, a euro collapse is called as the "mother of all financial disaster". Robert Zoellick, the former president of the World Bank has stated that Europe may have a Lehman moment. (Just like the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, which triggered the worst recession in the world since the 1930's).
The worst part of all is that most of the consequences which may occur under a Euro collapse are still unknown. Germany is thought to be the state with the most sound economy in the EU now. However, German investors hold 550bn euros of sovereign bonds outside of Germany. What would happen if the euro collapsed? Most likely they would lose it all and the German government would have to bail them out. One may only imagine how many EU bonds are in the hands of non-European banks and other investors.

My simple conclusion agrees with this LSE article: It is better to do everything to save the euro than to let it fall apart.

Thursday, 16 August 2012

Two-Speed Euro aka the Moses Plan

It has been proposed before and it seems that it's back in vogue: Make a 2-speed euro. The idea is that richer countries like Germany, Finland, Luxemburg, Austria and others, should have an "expensive" euro, whilst Greece, Spain, Italy and others which face problems should be better off with a "cheaper" euro. I like to call this the Moses solution (think of what he did to the Red Sea). The rationale is that now, the Euro is too cheap for rich countries (whatever that may mean!), while it is too expensive for the poorer ones.

It is not the first time something like this has been proposed. The main problem in the Eurozone is non-integration and what is the brilliant solution of some economists? An idea that divides the EU even more. Remember what I said about economists and real life?

The idea is simply absurd: First of all what does it mean that a currency is too cheap for a rich country? I don't think that the Germans are having trouble sleeping because their exports have boomed, due to a falling euro. The same holds for all other "rich" countries. Second, what defines what a rich country is? Ireland was a rich country before 2008 but I don't believe that anyone would consider letting them in the "rich" country ghetto now.

As in the case of Ireland, a nation may be rich one year and in the next, faced with an unprecedented disaster (of any kind not just economic) may fall into the "poor" class of countries. What would happen then? Just change to the low currency and if the country gets back on its feet change back to the expensive one again? I do not think that the public would really much appreciate this, having to change their hard money every time the economy takes a downturn. The future is unpredictable and uncertain. No country can guarantee that it will be solvent and trustworthy in the future.

Another important consequence is that there will be a "rich country ghetto" in the Union. To be accepted into the rich currency you will have to be accepted by the already existing countries, which would breed political disputes. The same problems would occur when a country should be exited from the rich country union as nations would be reluctant to dismiss a country like Germany, even if it has sever financial problems.

What economists with no real-life experience fail to see is the infeasibility of a Moses plan and the disastrous consequences that it may have if it is applied. Now is the time for more union and more integration. Dividing the EU would be a step towards breaking it up. I do not think that if the South US states had a problem, Bernacke would divide the dollar into two. Why should we?