Showing posts with label bail-out. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bail-out. Show all posts

Friday, 6 September 2013

Is Europe Recovering?

At the time when the world's nations are wondering whether or not a military intervention in Syria is the way to go, the economy has managed to make it to the spotlight. It appears that good news are plummeting the market and judging from the table and graph above Europe is heading towards recovery. Or is it?

When the data are presented the way the are above, emphasis is given to the "X-month high" wording on the right. Yet, a more careful look in the manufacturing PMI shows something slightly different:
Even though the index appears to be increasing, this has not been because things are going better. It is because they are less terrible than before. In the words of Markit's Phil Smith (emphasis mine):
"The headline PMI continued its climb towards the 50.0 threshold as a slower decrease in new orders led manufacturers to moderate their reductions in output, employment and stocks of purchases compared to June. Although still some way off showing outright stabilisation in the sector, these latest data are at least a stark improvement from those observed at even the start of the year and bring hope that a recovery is on the horizon. “July’s decrease in factory employment was, as with new orders, the least marked since the start of 2010. This will have helped to relieve upward pressure on Greece’s unemployment rate which has already started to show signs of plateauing."
It is the economic analog of banging your head on the wall and then switching to banging it on plastic; you feel less pain and you are losing less blood than before, yet, you are still bleeding and you are still in pain. As Smith puts it, there are signs of plateauing. Nevertheless, this plateau has not been reached yet and we cannot be certain of when it will be.

In the optimistic analyses, it appears that we give too much emphasis on a single indicator. Consider for example, the unemployment rate: it has been rather stable during the summer, which means that either all EU countries have not witnessed a change in the unemployment rate (which is not true) or that it has fallen in some and increased in others. During the crisis, the drivers of unemployment have been the countries of South Europe, where it seems that, with the exception of Cyprus, unemployment was either stable or decreasing (by 0.1% at most) in July. Good news right? It depends. It may be that recovery is on its way, yet it may also be that we have had a surge in tourists in the highly seasonal South economies. The reader may object that the unemployment rate is seasonally adjusted; even so, a small deviation of 0.1% is something which no statistician would claim as possibly unaffected by seasonal effects no matter how good the adjustment is. The Greek statistical authority actually reports higher income from tourism in the second quarter of 2013 and thus revised its GDP growth to -3.8% from 4.6%. And just as any person who lives or has been to the South of Europe will tell you, the busiest months are always July and August.

On the other end of the spectrum, Cassandras are, as always, abundant: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard comments that the future may not be as bright as we think it will be, given that even if Europe recovers Germany will require a rates rise in order to stop overheating its own economy. Yet, the overheating of the German economy is not bound to happen even if Europe recovers. A rise in investment in the South would most likely equal a rise in exports in the North which would help boost the German economy. What the Germans should worry about is not overheating their economy but over-dependence on exports; a Eurozone recovery is something they should be looking forward to. What is more, Central Banks do not really influence policy that much: lending rates have already started increasing in Germany as discussed later.

Yet, Evans-Pritchard is definitely right on one thing though: oil prices have been increasing over the recent Syria turmoil and this is not a good sign in times of recession. High inflation in addition to extremely high unemployment could escalate to a situation much worse than the 1970's stagflation. Although the probability of an oil shock more than 100% is very low, it is still existent. As usual, political and military action in Middle East will define the price Western countries have to pay for their growth. In the same article, there is mention of M3 money slowing down to a 1.3% annualized rate of growth and the euro appreciating against the Japanese yen, the Brazilian real and US dollar. What is missing here is that these are the unavoidable consequences of non-EU policy: the extended QE policies in Japan and the US have forced their currencies to depreciate and the Brazilian real has actually been depreciating in general since 2012. Neither of those really means anything when it comes to recovery.

The most interesting topic Evans-Pritchard presents is "the rise in borrowing costs by 70 basis points (or 0.7%) across Europe". Although I wonder where he got the data (the FT's Michael Steen comments that lending rates have reached a two-year low in Spain and Italy whereas it the same appears to hold in France as well) the issue is the location of this increase in borrowing costs, as aggregate and averaged data are more often than not misleading. If countries like Germany and Finland are witnessing increased lending rate (just as the graph to the right indicates) then this is more good news than bad ones since the spread between EU countries is actually decreasing and it is the natural consequence of prosperous economies beginning to slow their growth rate. The decrease in of more than a percentage point in lending rates since 2012 is of tremendous importance both for SME's facing trouble as well as for future investment.

Unfortunately, after all this analysis and deconstructing of both the positives and the negatives, the question still remains: is the EU moving to greener pastures or will it remain in the land of austerity-driven recession for quite a while? The answer is that unfortunately we cannot know for sure until 2013 has gone by. PMI indices, euro appreciation and lower costs of lending are all signs of better days ahead, yet their effect is yet uncertain. If borrowing costs continue their fall and if the PMI continues to rise we may witness more growth than expected by the end of the year, and this is what most analysts expect.

Probably the most important issue here is that uncertainty has been lifted from the Eurozone. Although there are still fears of Italy and Spain defaulting, the probability is much lower than before; even in Cyprus, the bail-in has marked the end of uncertainty despite all the terrible consequences it has brought with it. Markets prefer bad news to uncertainty and this is what we are currently observing in the Eurozone. It is not that "Europe, it seems, has become anaesthetised to bad news," as Simon Tilford from the Centre for European Reform says. It is just that finance and economics are, by construction, optimistic fields. There is no point in planning for the future if you do not really hope, deep down, that it will be better than the present. And as already said, less bad news equals good news for some and they are right up to a point.

Personally, although I believe that the results of Q3 will further enlighten us on whether a recovery is on its way,  the situation is like a fire which is about to be put out in the near future; yet one for which the probability of rekindling is extremely high. The rekindling can come in various forms: oil shocks, bank failures, state defaults and even additional bail-outs. Yet, with the possible exception of a 3rd bail-out for Greece, everything else has very little probability; which does not really mean that we should rest assured that recovery is on its way.

Monday, 18 March 2013

Cyprus: the bail-out, the bail-in and the laundering

For those who haven't heard, the latest Eurogroup summit on Friday (or better Saturday morning) ended with an agreement for Cyprus to impose a one-off deposit tax of 6.75% on deposits up to €100,000 and 9.9% for over that amount. In addition, the Cypriot government has agreed to increase company tax to 12.5% from 10% and privatize some of its profitable state-owned businesses. The total amount expected to be generated from the Cyprus deal is the following:

Source: Wall Street Journal
The so called Troika has been arguing that a €17bn package would be sufficient to revive the island's economy, yet it would make its debt burden unsustainable as it approximately equals Cyprus's GDP. Yet, it appears that the total funds which have to be generated will near €20bn, of which €5.8bn will be produced via the deposits levy. A levy which has caused global outrage given that it affects deposits which were considered to safe under every scenario; most importantly it creates a precedent which experts fear that can be used against Italy or Spain when they opt for a bail-out. Another question which has not been answered yet is why was the amount increased and if the Eurogroup is essentially forcing Cyprus to pay on its own.

The German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as most German politicians who appear to support the aforementioned deal, stated that Cypriot depositors should assume responsibility for what their banks have done. Money-laundering and the extreme size of the Cypriot banking sector are often brought forward as the rationale behind their actions. (for a review of the money laundering issues in Cyprus, Matina Stevis's article in Wall Street Journal is an excellent source)

Let's take these issues from the start:

1. Money-laundering: It may (or may not) be true that Cypriot banks have been involved in money laundering activities. However, it is quite unlikely that ordinary people who are working in 9-5 jobs in any sector are involved in this. Yet, it is these people who are being targeted in the levy. Not high-profile managers, lawyers or bankers but people who are struggling to save some money to pay for their children's education or have an easy retirement.

2. Risk Premia: Some have also argued that "with interest rates as high as 5% in term deposits there was a substantial risk premium which indicated danger". Perhaps this is true. However, these rates only apply for term deposits with amounts in excess of €50,000 and not for current accounts or savings accounts where most of the money lies. In addition, not everyone is a hedge-fund manager with the ability of sending enormous amounts of money abroad. Everyday citizens cannot afford the luxury of having their paycheck deposited in Germany or anywhere else in Europe for that matter.

3. The size of the banking sector: Stories have been circulating the web that the problem is Cyprus's enormous banking sector. The following graph indicates that private sector deposits in Italy are much higher than the ones in Cyprus. From the same data it appears that Ireland's case was much worse prior to 2010. No-one can doubt that the banking sector is big indeed. Yet, forcing it to break-up (for example exiting from Europe) will mean that you are depriving it of many growth opportunities over the next decade; especially after it has taken all the losses from bad loans and bond haircuts.


4. Greek PSI: One cannot help but wonder why the EU had not taken into consideration that the cause of the Cyprus problem was essentially the decision to slash the Private Sector Involvement in Greek bonds by 70% (a proposal that the former Cyprus Central Bank Governor Athanasios Orphanides had strongly opposed). The decision cost Cyprus approximately €5 billion (without counting for the bad loans which arose as a consequence).

The worst part of the deal is that it is bound to set a precedent: if Italy applies for a bail-out fears of deposit haircuts will wreck havoc in the country's economy with a bank run bound to occur as soon as the news hit the market. Although Cyprus is not systemic per se, the trust issues which arise are. From now on, every time a country will opt for a bail-out fears of deposit haircuts will evoke memories of the Cyprus case. 

Frances Coppola wonders "under what type of taxation scheme are people provided with shares to compensate them for the taxes they have paid?", while on another post yours truly has argued against risk-free assets transforming to risk bearing ones. While the Cypriot Parliament will reconvene tomorrow the question on when the banks will resume business is still vague: Although today is an established bank holiday, tomorrow has been announced as one as well. New information says that a new plan will involve less cuts for those under €100,000 (approximately 3%), yet this is still unofficial. In addition, small depositors are almost sure not to take their money abroad. It is the big depositors, with millions of funds who are the threat to the island's banking sector.

What poses the greatest threat for Eurozone's health is not that Cyprus will cause a bank run in other Member-States; it is highly unlikely (although a run will probably occur in Cyprus, with foreign depositors leaving en masse from the island). What is feared is the precedent: if they have done it before, they can do it again. And an escalating crisis arising from bank runs in Italy or Spain under rumours of bail-out could probably bring the Eurozone at its knees.

Friday, 22 February 2013

Let Cyprus fail? Why?

Although I thought I would never have to write anything more of the subject it appears that some people just don't get it. The usual comments on the subject include "why save Russian oligarchs?" or "why is the country systemic?" or "they are have money laundering issues" or even "we should set a precedent". Again, I will direct any people who still believe any of the above comments to some of the previous posts on this blog, where you may find a long explanation of why these are not good excuses. (the reader may have a look here, here, and here).

In brief the answers to the above comments is that:

1. Why save Russian oligarchs?
Answer: Russian oligarchs are in no need to be saved by anyone. They can simply transfer the funds from one bank to another at the click of a mouse. And no oligarch has such an important amount of money in the country that it can really affect him even if he loses it. The bail-out is for the Cypriot banks which have suffered from the inane decision for a 70% PSI and for the government for is to take us this responsibility. In essence, it is for the Cypriot people and not for the rich. This is capitalism people; the rich are well-off both in recessions and booms.

2. Why is the country systemic?
Answer: Does it really matter? We are not talking about handing them with €100 billion but with €17. This does sound like much for us ordinary people but it isn't really that much for a government. And if the agencies do their mathematics well they will see that the whole situation can be reversed with about €4 (for details have a look at this article).

3. They are have money laundering issues  
Answer: Not really... According to the non-profit Basel Institute on Governance Cyprus is on the 114th position for money laundering. (the lower a country is ranked are less possibility for money laundering exists). Compare that with Germany (68th), Netherlands (109), United States (97th) or Switzerland (71th) and Austria (74th). And I do remind you that this is an independent organization.

4. We should set a precedent
Answer: Set a precedent for what? When the EU screws up in its decisions (hint: 70% PSI involvement on the Greek haircut) why are going to let those affected by those, fail? So the rationale behind this is simply: "we didn't let Greece default, but we screwed up thus we have to let someone else take the fall for no apparent reason". And who is easier to take the fall but the little guy? Of all the excuses for not helping Cyprus this is by far the worst; it exemplifies the sort of money-focused, nationalistic, opportunistic behaviour which the EU was hoping to destroy. What do we care if a nation is destroyed based on our bad decisions?

There are two options actually: either they get the money or the fail. If it's the second then why not exit the Eurozone and print some new Cypriot pounds to compensate for their losses? And if this happens how about some new pesetas or drachmas? I repeat what I have said before: if one country exits the Eurozone or the EU then others will follow.

A look at the graph at the beginning of this article will tell you that the Cypriot state does not really have a problem with debt maturities before June and July. It is claimed that if Cyprus can last until the German elections in September it will be easier on them. But if they can last until September then why bother with a bail-out?

Saturday, 2 February 2013

Capitalistic Communism: The time where all financial institutions belong to the state

The Soviet Union Saving Bank book
When the late 2007 crisis was at its initial states, very few voices of worry were heard in world. "Just another slump of the economy" most people thought. "We have seen a lot and this is nothing special." Yet, a few months later, when things began to get more serious many were concerned about the future. Then came the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank, which marked an era of state involvement in the market. The US Congress allowed for a $500 billion cash injection in the market (the Troubled Asset Relief Program), with direct asset purchases through the stock market. The time of nationalizations had began.

The crisis moved to Europe in no time. It was not long before many banks were forced to seek government assistance in order to stay afloat. Her Majesty's Government in the UK acquired an 84% stake in Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), a 43.5% in Lloyds TSB and a 43.5% in HBOS (Lloyds later acquired HBOS). In Holland stakes in ABN AMRO Bank and Fortis Bank were bought by the government, with ING Groep also assisted later, and SNS Reaal was also bailed-out just yesterday.

Spain's Bankia was another indication of the terrible state of the financial system, requesting a €19 billion bail-out on 25 May 2012. During the same time, in Cyprus, Popular Bank received a €1.8 billion bail-out making it 84% state-owned. Just as more banks are announcing their yearly results, Credit Agricole announced a €2.7 billion write-down yesterday and Germany’s Deutsche Bank posted a loss of €2.2 billion the day before. I do not have any current knowledge concerning the state of recapitalization procession in Greece and by how much the state will be involved in the banks, yet it will not be minimal. When Monte dei Paschi di Siena's audit is finished by the Italian authorities we will also have a clearer view on whether the state will assist it, as it did with Banco Popolare in 2009.

What may have caused this? The simple answer is the housing price crashes which followed housing bubbles in more than 25 countries around the world. With increased exposure to investment banking, most of the banks had severe losses during the first years of the Great Recession. Then, some had to request state assistance. With governments classifying them as "systemic" they had no option but to bail them out. This increased the national debt. Thus, they had to take some austerity measures in order to bring their deficits down. This pushed the economy further into recession and many more financial institutions were brought to their knees.

The issue is what becomes next. Will banks be perpetually in the hands of governments? Although control may not be held by the state (as in the case of British banks where the government received only preferred shares) it appears as if we are moving towards an economy where most banks are controlled by the state. I would not discuss the idea of whether this is good or bad. Yet, it would be very likely that conflicts of interest would rise in the case where governments control financial institutions. Thus, when states decide to bail-out an institution they should be sure that it will be able to pay back the hard-earned taxpayers money.

What I have never understood is why government just hand the bail-out money to the institutions which pose systemic danger instead of doing something about it. Wikipedia defines systemic risk as "the risk of collapse of an entire financial system or entire market, as opposed to risk associated with any one individual entity, group or component of a system. It refers to the risks imposed by interlinkages and interdependencies in a system or market, where the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bankrupt or bring down the entire system or market."

If we know what systemic risk is and we know which organizations are likely to produce such effects how come we are not doing anything about it? Why don't regulators split the state-owned institution into 2 or 3 (or more) smaller ones which would pose much less strain on the economy if they fail instead of just perpetuating the situation? In addition to less danger to the economy, competition will also be increased, giving more opportunities and lower prices to the consumers and even more jobs will be created. Yet, no government has taken such actions even though they have classified institutions as posing systemic danger. This would have the extra advantage (for the government) of being able to sell the stakes they currently own over an IPO to investors, thus making sure that they will receive their money back, with a profit.

One cannot help wondering what are they waiting for...

P.S. New Eurostat data suggest that the EA17 unemployment has risen by 1% over the past year. Highest increases were noted in Greece, 7%, Cyprus 5% and Spain 3%. Wondering how much time it would take for policymakers to understand that what they are doing is wrong.

Tuesday, 4 December 2012

Machtpolitik

News from the EU today state that Spain has requested a bail-out package for its banks and that the Eurozone finance Ministers have agreed to grant the nation with €39.5 billion which will be awarded next week. Normally, such a procedure would need experts from the IMF, the European Commission and the European Union (the so-called Troika) to go through. Nevertheless, in the words of Jean-Claude Junker "We have also welcomed the decision by the ESM (European Stability Mechanism) board of directors to authorise the first tranche of the programme of up to 39.5 billion (euros). The disbursements will be made in mid next week," 

This is an overall positive reaction of the EU, which has for the first time used the availability of ESM/EFSF funds to assist a nation in need. This is the main reason that the above mentioned funds were created in the first place. The handling of this situation should be made an example of any similar cases in the future. Neverthless, one things springs to mind: why weren't solutions like the above used to assist nations like Greece and Cyprus as well? Why were the Greek and Cypriot banks denied of direct assistance from the ESM/EFSF fund?

The answer is simple and it was given to me by Craig James Willy: Machtpolitik. The terms has its origins in 1979, in a book by Martin Wight, and it is used to describe power politics in the international scene. It is used as a form of international relations in which sovereign entities protect their own interests by threatening one another with military, economic or political aggression. To put this in a less subtle way this is what the Eurogroup is saying: Greece and Cyprus are much smaller and of much less importance to the EU than Spain.

Martin Wight. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Whilst I am positive that some will in fact disagree with me on this, I would be that this is what the Greeks and Cypriots feel. They have to pay for the sins of their banks, and yet someone else is getting better treatment than they are. And of course I am not going against to what I have been saying all this time and state that Spain should also suffer from more austerity measures. On the contrary, this was an excellent decision. However, it should be implemented to Greece and Cyprus as well.

The EU in its design, was aimed at promoting solidarity and equality amongst nations. Why should a nation which has suffered so much as Greece being forced to suffer more when the alternative is both easier to implement and less brutal on the people? Why should Cyprus have to go through the same as Greece just to conduct an economic experiment, with an ending act we already know?

The situation is not just of two small nations. It is of how we treat the little guy in general. If the Union does not care of two small nations why should it care of poorer citizens, why should it bother with assisting those in need? If we do not protect the little guy how can we protect the rich and strong ones? To quote JFK "If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich."

The same situation in Greece and Cyprus now can easily happen in some other state in the future. What is the EU going to do about that? Make that country suffer and then assisting it or just help it like it should? As the answer to that is ambiguous, uncertainty about the future grows. The power to make the EU more democratic, efficient and sustainable is in our hands. We will use it?

Friday, 2 November 2012

Strange Tactics

To my (and I think everyone's) surprise, yesterday German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, has stated that he does not expect concrete negotiations between Cyprus and international lenders to start before 2013, suggesting that the island has missed a November 12 deadline and could be at risk of running out of money before the end of the year. In addition, the Cypriot are now fearing that Troika will enforce an increase in the tax rate for businesses, which is now at an attractive 10%. What ever happened to your supporting the Eurozone Wolfgang?

It seems that Schäuble's comments where not the only strange stories on the news. Having heard the estimates for the financial aid Cyprus will need to overcome the current situation I was struck with amazement: Troika suggests a €12 billion pack for the two large Cypriot banks (Bank of Cyprus and Popular Bank) and an additional €5 billion for government needs. If one has a look at the balance sheets of those two companies (you can find them here for the Bank of Cyprus and here for the Popular Bank) the total number of loans of both banks combined does not exceed €50 billion. (To be fair the amount is about €46 billion, nevertheless I will be kind to Troika and round it up to 50). Thus we have: €50 billion in loan portfolio and €12 billion in aid, which means, hmm that essentially 24% of ALL loans given out by the two banks are considered as non-performing.

Really? 24%? How on earth could these banks have survived so far? Were they using nothing as collateral? If the numbers are true, then it would be better to incarcerate all of the top management of both banks, and all officers of the regulatory authority. Nevertheless, if those numbers were true, the banks should have been declared insolvent a long time ago. If one every 4 loans is non-performing I cannot see how a bank could have survived. However, to the extent of my knowledge, (and in accordance to their financial statements) both banks are still functioning and are still profitable.

Source: politico.ie

I do not know how the Troikans have reached these conclusions but they hardly seem plausible. Negotiations seem to reach an impasse on the amount of assistance the island needs. The Cypriot government says €6 billion, Troika insists on €12 billion. I think this is the first time in history when the receiver of the loan states that he does not need more and the loan giver insists on him taking some more. (then again a resemblance with the sub-prime lending policies in the US does come in mind...). Imagine it happening in a bank:

Client: Can I have a €10.000 loan?
Bank Officer: I think you should have a €20.000 one. It is better for you.
Client: But I believe that €10.000 would be sufficient, and besides I would have trouble repaying any larger amount.
Bank Officer: Still, I think that you should take the €20.000.

Thank God the IMF is not a regular bank or we would be bailing them out every now and then. 

Wednesday, 29 August 2012

Bank Bailouts: The Correct Way

Some time ago, a book I read stated that the very nature of capitalism was to allow firms to die without any consequences to the system. The author wondered why the same thing isn't possible with banking institutions. That author was Nassim Nicolas Taleb and the book was titled Black Swan. (However, I wouldn't really recommend the book) Although at first I thought the author was right, after considering it I realized that the banks are not at all like any other firm.

If tomorrow Google were to file for bankruptcy, the consequences would be a lack of a good search engine and thousands of Google employees left without a job (and you wouldn't be reading this!). Otherwise, no harm would be done to the ordinary person. Now imagine what would happen if one of the major banks were to collapse: millions of people would suddenly be worried of being left with little or no money (although a country guarantees approximately 100,000 euros of deposits by each person in each bank). In the end, people would get their savings back (expect the persons which had amassed millions who will only get 100,000), however, the whole procedure would be traumatic to the ones who were unlucky enough to get caught in it. Nevertheless, such a procedure is preferred to the cost of pumping a bank with new money every now and then just to sustain it.

Thus, the question becomes: When should banking institutions be rescued? The answer is simple, although it may be tricky to define at times: When they are solvent, largely problem-free and have faced trouble only as a result of an unpredictable event to which they bore minimal or no responsibility. This, for example, would be the case with most EU banks which suffered great losses from the Greek haircut (although there were other banks which had overextended credit over the years).

If a banking institution is thought to be worthy of rescue then the course of action should be by directly providing liquidity to them. This would mean that governments, Central Banks or (preferably) an institution like the ESM, should provide liquidity to the banks; with the latter issuing new shares with voting rights, committing to repurchase them at an amount obtained after accounting for a fixed interest rate, and agreeing that the institution's participation in the bank's equity capital would be reduced each year, thus making sure that the stream of payments from the bank to the state would be continuous. Even if government (or Central Bank) intervention in banking institutions is not considered a good thing, it is much better than merely purchasing preferred shares, as the very recent Barclay's example indicates. By agreeing to pay interest on the amount given to them and repurchasing those shares at fixed intervals, it is assured that the taxpayers' money is not just thrown down a bottomless pit, making the banks more careful in their future investments and gradually reducing government intervention within them.

Following this, the distressed bank should implement some austerity measures, either by cutting down salaries or other benefits or, better, by reducing its activities both at domestic as well as at an international level. Needless to say, the bank's heads at the time of government intervention should be replaced. The bank could spin-off some of its operations if they are profitable, however, this should be done in a way that the new company is an independent one and not with the bank still controlling a substantial interest in it. Likewise, the spin-off should not be sold to another bank as this would increase the other bank's risk of becoming too-big-to-fail.

In the case of the bank becoming insolvent, problem-ridden with issues which are not due to unexpected events (e.g. management issues, poor lending decisions, etc) then it should be let collapse just like any other ordinary firm. If the bank has some operations which are profitable and well-functioning, then these should be spun-off, or sold to another company, even though selling them to another bank should be avoided for reasons of the other bank becoming extremely large. What the reader may inquire is what if the second bank is already too big? What difference would it make if the profitable operation is sold to them? First of all, a new spin-off will require more employees (think of new management, trainees, secretaries, even cleaners) than if it is sold to another company where existing economies of scale would take over. This would have a positive effect on unemployment especially since other bank's employees are expected to be laid off as a result of the collapse. Then, even the acquiring bank is already too big, in what scenario would the government (or another institution) be spending less for stabilization: saving a 100 billion bank or a 105 billion bank? And remember that's billion...

Under the current scheme, most banks are either classified as too big to fail or too little to have any exposure. Take the UK for example where only 5 independent large banks exist, with the government having interest in two of them. What should have been done was to reduce the level of activities of the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group to levels where such intervention would be easier in the future, also allowing the creation of more banking institutions, which would promote a competitive environment instead of an oligopolistic one.